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Chapter 1
Introduction
Marriage equality became an objective of the gay and lesbian rights movements only after decades of arduous
activism transformed the prospect of legalizing same-sex marriage into a realistic goal. This would not have
been possible without changes to the institution of marriage that allowed gay and lesbian people to see
themselves participating in it or the major events in gay and lesbian history that drew attention to the
inequities created by marriage-inequality (Chauncey, 2005). Throughout the 20th century, the institution
of marriage changed to allow people the freedom to choose their own partner, it also became more gender-
neutral and a nexus for the allocation of benefits (Chauncey, 2005, 59-60). Finally, religious hegemony over
marriage declined (Chauncey, 2005, 59). All together, the changes to the institution of marriage allowed
gay and lesbian people to envision themselves participating in marriage (Chauncey, 2005, 59-60). But, it
was the AIDS epidemic and the lesbian baby boom that forced gay and lesbian people to reckon with the
ramifications of marriage inequality. In 2004, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex
marriage (Pew Research Center, 2015, Jan.). In the coming years, marriage was legalized in several other
states and, finally, In June of 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued a momentous ruling in the case
of Obergefell v. Hodges that made same-sex marriage legal across the nation (Pew Research Center, 2015,
Jan.).
In addition to the historic, social and symbolic benefits that access to marriage provides gay and lesbian
people, there are a number of direct economic benefits that are now available to gay and lesbian couples
through marriage. However, it is unclear what e↵ect marriage will have on the wages of gay and lesbian
couples. There is a well-documented “marriage premium” for straight men that ranges between 10% and
40% (Korenman and Neumark, 1991). There is, however, little consensus over the cause of this premium.
1
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Three main explanations have emerged: the selection of more productive men into marriage, increased inter-
household specialization among married couples and employer favoritism for married men. Though there is a
growing literature on the economics of gay and lesbian household, the translation of these core explanations
to gay and lesbian households is not a straightforward task because there is no clear indication of what each
theory would imply for same-sex couples.
In this senior project I address the wage e↵ects of marriage in same-sex couples from a theoretical and
empirical perspective. I contribute to the growing body of literature on the labor market outcomes of gay and
lesbian people, as well as the literature on the organization of same-sex households by including empirical and
theoretical analyses of the ways that household specialization impacts the wages of married and unmarried
same-sex couples. Finally, I make a unique contribution to the literature as the first paper to empirically
analyze the wage e↵ects of marriage in same-sex households.1
Answering this question is important for several reasons. Badgett (2009a) reviews the evidence of wage
discrimination against gay and lesbian people. Nearly all of the studies conducted find that there is a
significant wage gap between gay men and observably similar straight men that ranges from 2% to 32%
(Badgett, 2009a). Allegretto and Arthur (2001) suggest that it is possible that this wage inequality between
gay men and their straight counterparts might be narrowed if gay men benefit from a marriage premium.
That is, much of the wage di↵erence between gay and straight men may be driven by the fact that gay people
could not marry. Addressing the wage e↵ects of marriage for same-sex couples is also important because
the rates of poverty among gay and lesbian people are significantly higher than their heterosexual peers
(Badgett et al., 2013). Moreover, lesbian women have higher rates of poverty than gay men (Badgett et al.,
2013). A marriage premium could provide crucial support to these economically and socially vulnerable
populations. However, if marriage decreases the wages of gay and lesbian couples, then this could compound
their vulnerability.
The rest of the Senior Project is structured as follows: in Chapter 2 I place the movement for marriage
equality within the historical context of the gay and lesbian rights movement out of which the demand for
the legalization of same-sex marriage was born. Chapter 3 presents the theory and supporting empirical
work for the three main explanations for the straight marriage premium. I then attempt to adapt these
explanations to gay and lesbian household using the existing literature on the di↵erences between same-sex
and di↵erent-sex households. Chapter 4 contains a description of the data set and its limitations, a detailed
1Zavodney (2007) attempted to analyze the “marriage” premium, but did so by analyzing the wage di↵erentials between
cohabiting and single gay and lesbian people.
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account of the empirical specification and the results. I find that both gay and lesbian people experience
a small marriage premium that appears to be driven by increases in specialization. I end Chapter 4 by
discussing the results and their implications. Finally, I conclude my Senior Project with a discussion of the
broad implications of my results, the limitations of my results and avenues for future research in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2
The Road to Marriage Equality
Marriage equality was not the initial objective of the gay and lesbian rights movements. Any rights that gay
men and lesbians in America had prior to World War II were ransacked by McCarthyism, which put marriage
equality beyond the imagination of the early gay rights movements. In addition to the rampant accusations
of communist sympathizers infiltrating the federal government, there were attempts to link political beliefs
with sexual activity (Fone, 2000, 390). The fear of a well-organized homosexual society which had existed
well before the twentieth century, was interlaced with the newfound threat of communism (Fone, 2000, 390).
Much like communists, gay and lesbian people were “increasingly denounced as cosmopolitan outsiders whose
loyalties were not to the nation but to an international or extranational community of people like themselves”
(Chauncey, 2005, 19). Guy Gabrielson, the Republican party’s national chairman suggested that “Perhaps
as dangerous as the actual communists are the sexual perverts who have infiltrated our Government in
recent years” (Adam, 1987, 58). Congressman Arthur Miller averred that foreign agents were “given a
course in homosexuality, then taught to infiltrate in perverted circles” (Fone, 2000, 392). Other congressmen
suggested that homosexual people constituted a “Homintern,” an allusion to the Communist International or
Commintern (Chauncey, 2005, 19). A concerted e↵ort was undertaken to remove all homosexual people from
positions within the federal government (Chauncey, 2005, 20). Warning that “one homosexual can pollute
an entire government o ce,” the senate committee investigating “the employment of homosexuals and other
sex perverts in government” recommended that gay and lesbian federal employees be purged (Chauncey,
2005, 20). Some defenders of the measure used the increased possibility of blackmail among gay and lesbian
people as a justification for the firings, which “led to the circular reasoning by which homosexuals were fired
because of their potential to be blackmailed, ... while the chance of being blackmailed was caused by the
4
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stigma placed on homosexuality in the first place” (Eaklor, 2008, 88). Between 1947 and 1950 more than
1,500 job applicants were rejected on suspicion of homosexuality, nearly 4,500 people were expelled from the
military and 420 gay and lesbian workers were forced to resign from the federal government (Adam, 1987,
58).
With the government’s blessing, the police and local authorities undertook an intensive campaign of
harassing gay and lesbian people. Many gay-oriented businesses were deemed illegal by the authorities
(Chauncey, 2005, 7). The New York State Liquor Authority declared that any establishments with liquor
licenses must not employ, serve or allow homosexual people (Chauncey, 2005, 7). A Brooklyn bar was
shut down in 1960 because it was, according to the police report, a gathering place for “homosexuals and
degenerates” who behaved inappropriately by “wearing tight trousers,” walking “with a sway in their hips”
and “gesturing with limp wrists” (Chauncey, 2005, 8). Instead of courting the “gay vote” as they do now,
elected o cials would order increased harassment of gay bars and gathering spots to demonstrate a tough
on crime approach to policing (Chauncey, 2005, 8). In 1959, San Francisco’s mayor launched a two-year
campaign that arrested forty to sixty men and women each night (Chauncey, 2005, 9). Chauncey (2005, 9)
points out that raids of this sort were not an aberration: they happened regularly and in every major city.
In addition to police raids, the mid 20th century saw a drastic increase in the enforcement of anti-sodomy
laws and many states revised penal codes to impose more draconian punishments (Canaday, 2008). In
California, people could receive a life sentence for violating the state’s sodomy law (Canaday, 2008). The
anti-sodomy laws themselves were not new: the colonies had adopted similar laws in the 1600s that often
punished buggery with death, regardless of the participants’ sex (Canaday, 2008). However, these laws
were rarely enforced until the beginning of the 20th century when loosening morals prompted a puritanical
backlash in the form of expanded vice laws that included fellatio and even cunnilingus in some instances
(Canaday, 2008). In 1923, New York passed legislation that made it illegal to “frequent or loiter about
any public place soliciting men for the purpose of a crime against nature” (Chauncey, 2005, 10). With the
backing of this new law, New York police departments undertook a campaign that used plainclothes o cers
to entrap gay men by coming onto them, then arrest them when they consented to sex (Chauncey, 2005,
10). Between 1923 and 1966 this policy had led to the arrests of more than 50,000 gay men in New York
City alone (Chauncey, 2005, 10).
The oppression of gay men and lesbians was founded in an irrational hatred that was given legitimacy
by the scientific establishment, which concluded that the behavior of gay men and lesbians posed a grave
existential threat and needed to be stopped. Psychiatrists benefited from a growing public sentiment of
CHAPTER 2. THE ROAD TO MARRIAGE EQUALITY 6
the era that it was unrealistic to expect that any one person could grasp the entirety of the vastly growing
bodies of knowledge (Eaklor, 2008, 31). Thus, psychiatrists enjoyed an unchallenged authority to make
declarations about the mind (Eaklor, 2008, 31). They often used this social power to speak credibly on
gay and lesbian people (Eaklor, 2008, 31). In 1952 the American Psychiatric Association released the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders, (DSM-1 ) which “firmly established homosexuality
as a sociopathic personality disorder” (Eaklor, 2008, 81). More than half of the states had laws that allowed
police to forcefully subject those convicted of sodomy and other sex crimes to psychological examinations
and several of these laws also allowed for the patient to be held in mental institutions until they were cured
of their homosexuality (Chauncey, 2005, 11). As to how to cure the behavior of gay men and lesbians Dr.
La Forest Potter writes that “Some of them we would probably kill. Others we would cure” (Potter, 1933,
236). Eaklor (2008, 81) reports that the sometimes involuntary treatments “ranged from psychotherapy to
shock therapy.”
Beyond the direct oppression of discriminatory firings and police harassment, gay and lesbian people were
denied any visibility in popular culture (Chauncey, 2005, 5-6). The “Hays Code,” enacted under pressure
from religious leaders who threatened to boycott and pursue restrictive legislation, prohibited Hollywood
films from depicting gay or lesbian characters, discussing gay themes or even alluding to the existence
of homosexuality (Chauncey, 2005, 5). Similar censorship was applied to the stage as well. Following a
successful lesbian drama and the announcement of another play addressing homosexuality, the state of New
York passed a “pad-lock law” that allowed any theater that staged a play with lesbian or gay characters to
be shut down by the authorities for a year (Chauncey, 2005, 6).
It was out of this oppression that the modern gay and lesbian movements were born.
2.1 Early Homophile Movements
Wary of the social and political climate surrounding homosexuality, the gay and lesbian movements of the
1950s followed the template provided by the rights movements of other oppressed groups and adopted the
cautious objective first of survival and then to assuage the general hostility they experienced (Adam, 1987,
60). The most important advancement of the period was the development of the Mattachine Society and later
the Daughters of Bilitis (Adam, 1987, 63). The early gay and lesbian organizations were heavily influenced by
the model of the movement for black civil rights and though no program was universally accepted, subscribed
to three basic tenets: civil rights discourse, education and assimilation (Chauncey, 2005, 24, 27).
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First, the activism of early gay and lesbian movements was based on civil rights discourse and sought
to portray gay and lesbian people as minority citizens, who were deserving of their civil rights (Chauncey,
2005, 27-28). The second pillar of the post-war movements was a focus on the education of those with the
social authority to speak on the morality of gay and lesbian people (Chauncey, 2005, 28). For example,
the founding “Mission and Purposes” of the Mattachine Society listed “‘TO EDUCATE’ homosexuals and
heterosexuals” toward “an ethical homosexual culture” as a core pledge (Adam, 1987, 62). The Daughters of
Bilitis held similar objectives (Adam, 1987, 64). The movements worked with sociologists, psychologists and
criminologists, hoping that their inability to credibly speak on their own behalf could be substituted with
professional opinions (Chauncey, 2005, 28; Eaklor, 2008, 81-82). One study conducted by the psychologist
Evelyn Hooker on gay men in Los Angeles was among the first to use a sample of participants that were
not actively seeking mental help and was consequently among the first to find that not all homosexuals
have mental illnesses (Chauncey, 2005, 28). The final tenet of early gay and lesbian movements was a
commitment to assimilation (Chauncey, 2005, 28-29; Adam, 1987, 64). Similar to the movements of other
minority groups, gay and lesbian groups thought that assimilation into society at large could be more easily
achieved by demonstrating that the only di↵erence between homosexual and heterosexual people was what
they do in bed (Adam, 1987, 63-64). The Daughters of Bilitis listed “Advocating a mode of behavior and
dress acceptable to society” in their stated objectives (Adam, 1987, 64). As such, “homophiles” would not
display their identity, culture or values in hopes that society at large would recognize their common humanity
(Adam, 1987, 64; Chauncey, 2005, 28-29). Many even sought to restrain the behavior of gay and lesbian
people that did not share their assimilationist ideals (Adam, 1987, 64; Chauncey, 2005, 28-29).
2.2 The Stonewall Riots: Assimilationism to Liberationism
McArthyism made anything other than assimilation into broader society seem unfeasible to the early move-
ments for gay and lesbian rights (Adam, 1987, 64). Adam (1987, 64) writes: “The authorities seemed to have
become wild beasts; there was nothing to be done but appease them, mollify them, and hope they would
exhaust their malicious rage.” However, the homophile tactic of encouraging assimilation was challenged
in the 1960s. Just as the homophile movement had been inspired by the early rights movements of other
oppressed groups, the gay and lesbian activists of the 1960s were inspired by the e↵orts of Martin Luther
King Jr. and others like him, who insisted that they be “let in to American society” and worked to achieve
those goals through non-violent public action (Adam, 1987, 69-70). The plethora of social movements that
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emerged in the 1960s came to be known as the “New Left” and stimulated a militancy in the gay and lesbian
movements that was at odds with the homophile approach of the 1950s (Adam, 1987, 68).
Franklin Kameny, an astronomer by training, was a victim of McCarthyism’s fervent attempts to root out
and fire gay and lesbian people employed by the federal government and soon became a prominent activist
for gay and lesbian rights (Adam, 1987, 70; Eaklor, 2008, 97). Having just emerged from a four year law suit
over his firing that ended when the supreme court would not hear his case, Kameny founded the Mattachine
Society of Washington in 1961 (Eaklor, 2008, 97). The Mattachine Society of Washington started a campaign
of launching o cial complaints against various government agencies for their discriminatory practices against
gay and lesbian people (Adam, 1987, 70). In a speech to the Mattachine Society of New York, Kameny argued
that gay people must proclaim a pride in being gay:
Homosexuality is . . . something around which the homosexual can and should build part of a
rewarding and productive life and something he can and should enjoy to its fullest. (Adam, 1987,
71)
The homophile old guard was swept out of the leadership of the Mattachine Society of New York during the
1964 elections and was replaced by activists (Adam, 1987, 71).
The transition was not as clean at the Daughters of Bilitis (Adam, 1987, 71). The leadership withdrew
from the conference of the East Coast Homophile Organizations (ECHO) over disagreements with the more
militant stances of other participating organizations and removed Barbara Gittings as the editor of the
organization’s publication when the journal’s stance became more confrontational (Adam, 1987, 71). The
membership of the Daughters of Bilitis was strongly divided between the old and new guards (Adam, 1987,
71-72). The conservative leadership was voted out in 1965 when the Daughters of Bilitis elected their first
black presidents (Adam, 1987, 72). However, the homophile leadership regained control of the organization
in 1966, which created a schism, causing many activists to leave for the Mattachine Society (Adam, 1987,
72).
There were other manifestations of the new activist doctrine throughout the 1960s. A 1968 conference
of gay activists adopted the slogan “Gay is Good,” a decision that was directly inspired by the motto
“black is beautiful” (Chauncey, 2005, 29). In San Francisco, the “Black Cat” drag queen Jose´ Sarria ran
for elected o ce as a city supervisor (Adam, 1987, 70; Eaklor, 2008, 117). Though Sarria did not win,
they did garner more than six thousand votes (Adam, 1987, 70). At the 1964 New Year’s Ball for the
Council on Religion and the Homosexual, attendees barricaded the doors to prevent the police from entering
(Eaklor, 2008, 118). Though four people were arrested, straight ministers, who were members of the group,
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held a press conference in which they publicly disparaged the actions of the police and the four people
who were arrested were eventually found not guilty (Eaklor, 2008, 118). Gay and lesbian activists also
participated in a series of pickets throughout the 1960s, including several at government buildings in protest
of anti-gay legislation or policy (Eaklor, 2008, 120-121). One group picketed a psychologist’s lecture titled
“Homosexuality: A Disease” in New York and were granted 10 minutes to for rebuttal (Eaklor, 2008, 120).
The gay and lesbian organizations had a handful of successes in the 1960s. Illinois became the first state to
decriminalize homosexuality between consenting adults in 1961 (Adam, 1987, 70). Also in 1961, the Motion
Picture Association of America lifted its ban on gay characters to accommodate Advise and Consent (Adam,
1987, 70). In 1966 the New York Mattachine Society succeeded in pressuring the New York City mayor to
end the police department’s use of entrapment (Chauncey, 2005, 35). This meant that, for the first time
in decades, gay New Yorkers did not have to fear that the man coming onto him was going to arrest him
(Chauncey, 2005, 35).
There were three central di↵erences between the homophile agenda and the new phase of gay and lesbian
activism (Chauncey, 2005, 30). First, the gay and lesbian liberationists were heavily influenced by the
rebirth of feminism in the 1960s (Chauncey, 2005, 30). The so-called “second wave” of feminism emerged in
the 1960s because “many women had become disillusioned with their prescribed role in postwar America”
(Eaklor, 2008, 111). This new era of feminism gave gay and lesbian people an analytical framework with
which to view their oppression and created a larger base of support for the gay and lesbian movements to
dismantle heterosexual dominance (Chauncey, 2005, 30). The second major di↵erence was the commitment
of the new gay and lesbian activists to transform the gay world into one that was more humane and organic
(Chauncey, 2005, 31). The 1970s saw the emergence and growth of gay and lesbian institutions around the
nation, from cultural hubs to activist organizations (Chauncey, 2005, 31). The new era of activism’s third
departure from the homophile agenda was the significance they placed on coming out to friends and family,
not as a purely personal act, but as a political one (Chauncey, 2005, 32). George Chauncey (2005, 33)
compares coming out to the blatant disregard that young black people in the south showed to the standards
of etiquette that had long maintained white supremacy:
In this social context, coming out to heterosexuals became a new moral imperative, an existen-
tialist act of witness to the truth of oneself that became even more compelling at a time when
many social movements called on people to engage in such risky acts of witness, from sitting at
a segregated lunch counter to burning a draft card. (Chauncey, 2005, 33)
Over the coming decades, the concerted e↵ort to encourage gay and lesbian people to come out to their
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friends and family succeeded on several fronts: the mass coming out humanized gay and lesbian people in
the eyes of many outsiders and made the demonization of gay and lesbian people less compelling. (Chauncey,
2005, 34).
The start of the modern gay and lesbian movement is typically dated to the Stonewall Riots in June of
1969. Police raids on the Stonewall Inn on Christopher Street in New York City were a common occurrence,
happening about once a month (Armstrong and Crage, 2006). The bar attracted a cast of people who were
not welcome elsewhere, including homeless teens and queens (Armstrong and Crage, 2006). Armstrong and
Crage (2006) describe the events that took place on the night of June 29, 1969:
On Friday June 27, around 1:20 a.m. . . . , police raided . . . As they started checking identifica-
tion, kicking people out, and making a few arrests, a crowd of ejected patrons, nearby residents
and passers-by gathered outside. This was unusual; people usually tried to slip away from bar
raids. . . . As they loaded the van with arrestees, the crowd grew angry and started throwing
pennies, bottles and bricks. With no backup, the police barricaded themselves in the bar.
Riot police arrived . . . and tried for hours to disperse the crowd. [Rioters were able] to block the
street and halt tra c in front of the Inn, and go around the block to taunt police from behind.
Violence continued until the streets were finally cleared at about 3:30 a.m. Papers reported
nearly a thousand rioters and several hundred police. Four policemen were hurt and thirteen
people were arrested. (Armstrong and Crage, 2006, 737)
Both sides participated in violence: the rioters used a parking meter and a trash can against the door and
the window of the Inn and threw lighter fluid and matches into the building while the police beat rioters,
which only incited more anger (Eaklor, 2008, 123). The media reported the story and the Stonewall Inn
was packed the next night (Eaklor, 2008, 123). When the police arrived, the riots resumed (Eaklor, 2008,
123). This time, in addition to physical resistance, the rioters also created gay and lesbian public displays of
a↵ection in front of the police o cers (Eaklor, 2008, 123). This same process continued for five days (Eaklor,
2008, 123). Though several commentators have noted that the Stonewall Riots were not as unique as they
have been portrayed,1 they were rallied around by the gay and lesbian movements and became the impetus
for a doctrine of gay and lesbian liberation.
2.3 Gay Liberation and Lesbian Feminism in the 1970s
Despite their stated goal of ending all discrimination, the New Left consistently failed to create true egal-
itarianism within its own ranks. Stokely Carmichael, the revolutionary head of the Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) said that “the only position for women in SNCC is prone” (Adam, 1987,
1Armstrong and Crage (2006) identify and describe a handful of similar rebellions against police harassment, many of which
predate the events at Stonewall, though none of which have received anywhere near the same attention.
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73). Gay and lesbian people faced similar hostility from other members of the New Left. Gay men expe-
rienced harassment from fellow activists and lesbian women faced the dual di culty being discriminated
against by other members of the New Left movements on the basis of their sex and their sexual orientation
(Eaklor, 2008, 115-116). Bayard Rustin, a black activist who profoundly influenced Martin Luther King Jr.
and has been described as King’s “closest advisor,” was pushed out of the movement’s leadership because
of a 1953 conviction for “public lewdness,” which was code for being gay (Eaklor, 2008, 110). Eldridge
Cleaver, an early leader of the Black Panther Party announced that “Homosexuality is a sickness, just as
are baby-rape or wanting to become the head of General Motors” (Lester, 2002, 21). Cleaver also excoriated
James Baldwin and other gay black men, writing that they are “outraged and frustrated because in their
sickness they are unable to have a baby by a white man” (Lester, 2002, 21). This discrimination made it
clear that, though the New Left had provided the gay and lesbian activists with training and theory, their
energy had to be taken to new movements where their interests were at the forefront (Eaklor, 2008, 116).
Thus, the gay liberation movement was born (Adam, 1987, 78).
Adam (1987, 78) writes:
Gay liberation never thought of itself as a civil rights movement for a particular minority, but
as a revolutionary struggle to free the homosexuality in everyone, challenging the conventional
arrangements that confined sexuality to heterosexual monogamous families.
The Stonewall rebellion sparked a massive proliferation of gay liberation groups around the country (Adam,
1987, 82). The Gay Liberation Front (GLF) was founded within a month of the Stonewall rebellion and
the Gay Activists Alliance (GAA) was born not long after that (Eaklor, 2008, 124). The GAA famously
adopted the New Left tactic of the “zap,” in which activists confronted public o cials and forced them to
take a stance on gay rights (Eaklor, 2008, 127). Members of the GAA also dressed in duck costumes to
picket the o ces of a credit agency when the owner said that he discriminated against gay people, whom
he could identify if they “[looked] like a duck, [walked] like a duck, [quacked] like a duck, and [associated]
with ducks” (Adam, 1987, 80-81). The gay liberation movement spread around the country and “within two
years from the Stonewall Rebellion, gay liberation groups emerged in every major city and campus in the
United States” (Adam, 1987, 82). Moreover, a slew of publications committed to gay liberation emerged in
cities across the nation (Adam, 1987, 82). Carl Wittman’s “Refugees from Amerika: A Gay Manifesto” was
a notable publication of the era and circulated in the months and years after the Stonewall rebellion (Eaklor,
2008, 124). It concluded by listing “AN OUTLINE OF IMPERATIVES FOR GAY LIBERATION,” which
included
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1. Free ourselves: come out, everywhere; initiate self-defense and political activity; initiate
community institutions; think.
2. Turn other gay people on: talk all the time; understand, accept, forgive.
3. Free the homosexual in everyone: we’ll be getting a lot of shit from threatened latents: be
gentle, and keep talking and acting free.
4. We’ve been playing an act for a long time: we’re consummate actors. Now we can begin
TO BE, and it’ll be a good show!
(Eaklor, 2008, 126)
The 1970s also saw a split between the doctrines of gay liberation and the emergent lesbian feminism
(Adam, 1987, 89). Lesbian women had found that they were unwelcome in the ranks of mainstream feminism
and ignored in the gay liberation movement (Eaklor, 2008, 145; Adam, 1987, 93). Betty Frieden, a feminist
leader and the author of The Feminist Mystique said that male homosexuality was “shallow unreality,
immature, promiscuity,” while entirely ignoring the plight of lesbian women (Adam, 1987, 90). As the
national president of the National Organization for Women, Frieden derided Rita May Brown and her
attempts to address heterosexism in the organization as a “lavender menace” (Adam, 1987, 90). Frieden
later purged Brown and other suspected lesbians from the organization (Adam, 1987, 90). However, things
were not much better in the gay liberation movement. Adam (1987, 92) writes:
Men took for granted many of the social conditions that made it possible for them to be gay. But
lesbians needed to address fundamental problems facing all women—such as equal opportunity
in employment and violence against women—in order to have su cient independence to become
lesbian. (Adam, 1987, 92)
That is, the ability to be financially independent, for example, allowed gay men a freedom that lesbian women
did not have access to (Adam, 1987, 92). Many lesbian women even found that heterosexual marriage
was a necessity (Eaklor, 2008, 146). Thus, lesbian women began a two pronged movement to fight their
intersectional oppression. In the early seventies, feminist movements began to acknowledge the rightful
place of lesbian issues in the women’s movement, which initiated a migration of lesbian women from the gay
liberation movement to a new “lesbian feminism” that aimed for a “women’s culture and values wherein
lesbianism was revalued as the highest expression of women’s solidarity and as central to women’s struggle”
(Adam, 1987, 92).
Despite the split, the movements had a number of successes in the 1970s. The “first great victory of
the movement” came in 1973, when the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association, at the
urging of Barbara Gittings and Franklin Kameny, revised the organization’s statement on homosexuality for
the second edition of the Diagnostics and Service Manual (Eaklor, 2008, 150). The new listing read:
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Sexual orientation disturbance (Homosexuality): This category is for individuals whose sexual
interests are directed primarily toward people of the same sex and who are either disturbed by,
in conflict with, or wish to change their sexual orientation. (Emphasis mine) (Eaklor, 2008, 150)
The relevant change is that homosexuality was now a mental illness only if the person was troubled by
it. Though the victory seems modest by modern standards, it represented a massive success for the move-
ment. Barbara Gittings rejoiced, saying “We went to bed sick and we woke up cured!” (Eaklor, 2008, 151)
The American Psychological Association and the American Medical Association soon took similar steps
(Chauncey, 2005, 37). The visibility and acceptance of gay and lesbian people spread as well. Time mag-
azine put a picture of a gay man on their cover, becoming the first major publication to do so (Chauncey,
2005, 38). An increasing number of gay and lesbian candidates ran for public o ce in the 1970s (Eaklor,
2008, 153-154). Perhaps the best known of these politicians was Harvey Milk, who was elected to the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors in 1977 (Eaklor, 2008, 154). Milk explicitly addressed the benefits of gay
visibility, writing that his decision to run for o ce was “not about personal gain, not about ego, not about
power—it’s about giving those young people out there in the Altoona Pennsylvania’s hope. You gotta’ give
them hope” (Eaklor, 2008, 155). Gay and lesbian people were also publicly accepted by several prominent
religious institutions that issued public statements supporting gay rights (Chauncey, 2005, 37).
Several political achievements were reached in the 1970s. The movements succeeded in the cessation
of some forms of employment discrimination against gay and lesbian people when the United States Civil
Service Commission lifted its ban on employing gay and lesbian people (Chauncey, 2005, 37-38). A number
of cities and towns across the country also passed anti-discrimination legislation protecting gay and lesbian
people, or added sexual orientation protection to existing legislation (Eaklor, 2008, 155; Chauncey, 2005, 38).
The movement’s achievements in the 1970s created hope that a national anti-discrimination bill protecting
gay and lesbian people might be soon to follow (Eaklor, 2008, 156). Indeed, several pieces of legislation were
introduced in both houses of congress, and then repeatedly re-introduced throughout the 1970s and 1980s
when the bills failed (Eaklor, 2008, 156). The early failings of the national anti-discrimination bill were made
worse by the emergence of a powerful and well organized “New Right” and AIDS, both of which ravaged the
gay and lesbian movements in the eighties (Eaklor, 2008, 157).
2.4 AIDS and the Backlash of the New Right
Eaklor (2008, 157) writes: “Every movement involving di↵erence and translated into a greater share of
collective power has been met with ridicule, resistance, and violence.” The gay and lesbian rights movements
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were no di↵erent. While there was little opposition to the early gay rights ordinances, this changed in
1977 when Anita Bryant, a Baptist singer and the spokesperson of Florida citrus growers, spearheaded a
“Save Our Children” campaign against new gay civil rights ordinances in Florida’s Dade County (Chauncey,
2005, 38; Eaklor, 2008, 170; Adam, 1987, 102). The title of Bryant’s campaign contributed to a well-worn
stereotype that gay and lesbian people pose a grave danger to young people because they cannot procreate
and therefore must recruit others (Eaklor, 2008, 170). Bryant’s side would ultimately win the battle, as the
ordinance was repealed by a ratio of more than 2:1 (Adam, 1987, 104). Bryant’s victory in Dade County
sparked a nationwide conservative backlash against gay and lesbian people that would see the repeal of similar
ordinances in cities across the country (Chauncey, 2005, 39; Eaklor, 2008, 170; Adam, 1987, 103-104). A
pattern emerged in the right wing tactics: the campaigns relied on the vast network of Evangelical churches,
which it used to fund and publicize its e↵orts and smeared the anti-discrimination laws by associating them
with a coterie of anti-gay catch phrases like “child molesting” and “national gay conspiracy” (Adam, 1987,
103-104). In total, anti-discrimination laws survived only two of the initial slew of referenda, those in
Seattle and San Francisco (Chauncey, 2005, 39; Adam, 1987, 104-105; Eaklor, 2008, 170). In the 20 years
after Bryant’s 1977 campaign in Dade County, there were more than 60 referenda on gay rights legislation,
including 16 in Oregon in 1993 alone (Chauncey, 2005, 46). Across the nation, gay rights supporters lost
nearly three fourths of these referenda (Chauncey, 2005, 46).
The New Right had arisen in response to the perceived excesses of the past decade (Eaklor, 2008, 159).
Until the 1970s there seemed to be a consensus that moral and religious views should be separate from
party politics, making the rise of the New Right a radical transformation (Eaklor, 2008, 169). There was a
proliferation of New Right groups in the late 1970s, all with the conviction that “a return to ‘family values’
was a legitimate goal of electoral politics” because violations of their moral code posed a grave danger to
the health of the nation (Eaklor, 2008, 169-170). The rise of the New Right meant that the emergence of
AIDS, which was quickly linked to gay men, could not have come at a worse time.
Chauncey (2005, 40) writes: “The enduring conviction that homosexuals stood outside the moral bound-
aries of the nation profoundly shaped the earliest responses to AIDS in the United States.” Between 1982
and 1985, the rate of AIDS in the United States spiked from 471 identified cases to more than 15,000 (Adam,
1987, 156). The government and public response to the AIDS epidemic was a salient reminder that gay men
were moral outsiders in America (Adam, 1987, 40). Despite the fact that AIDS disproportionately a↵ected
gay men, the media refused to cover the crisis until 1983 when it began focusing its coverage on the small
minority who were considered “innocent victims” because they were not gay (Adam, 1987, 156-157). It
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was not until the announcement in 1985 that Rock Hudson, who was among the “heterosexual heartthrobs
of the fifties,” was ill with AIDS that public attention was turned to AIDS among gay men (Adam, 1987,
168; Chauncey, 2005, 40-41). But, the outpouring of sensationalist concern only buttressed the existing
negative images of gay men (Chauncey, 2005, 41) and emboldened conservative groups propagating anti-gay
campaigns. Barry Adam (1987) writes: “From the beginning AIDS was socially constructed along a series of
moral oppositions that defined gay men as disease carriers polluting an innocent population.” Moreover, the
fear of contagion was exacerbated by the di culty of detecting a person with AIDS, catalyzing a new wave of
anti-gay discrimination (Chauncey, 2005, 41). Heterosexual people were afraid of using the same phones or
drinking fountain as gay men (Chauncey, 2005, 41), the City of Tulsa drained a public swimming pool after
a gay organization rented it and medical professionals refused to treat AIDS patients (Adam, 1987, 158).
Prominent conservatives promoted more nefarious solutions to protect heterosexuals from AIDS. William
Buckley, a conservative writer suggested tattooing people with AIDS (Chauncey, 2005, 41) while Jerry Fal-
well famously asserted that “AIDS is not just God’s punishment for homosexuals; it is God’s punishment for
the society that tolerates homosexuals” (Morford, 2007). Falwell also called for mandatory blood tests and
the creation of a central data base of people with AIDS (Adam, 1987, 157). It is no surprise, then, that there
was significant resistance to the scientific pursuit of a test for AIDS from within the gay movement (Shilts,
1988). The AIDS antibody test became a prominent tool to identify people with AIDS and was required by
the US military and other employers (Adam, 1987, 158). Adam (1987, 158) points out that the use of the
AIDS antibody test allowed employers to more e↵ectively discriminate against gay people: “AIDS-antibody
tests were becoming the pink triangles of the 1980s as public labeling procedures setting up gay men and
other risk categories as targets for public abuse.”
In addition to his connections with the Christian right, Reagan was also a staunch fiscal conservative
(Eaklor, 2008, 176). The policies of the Reagan administration forced AIDS researchers to seek funding
from the existing allocations of the CDC and NIH, sparking heated internal politics that slowed the progress
of research while thousands of people were dying (Shilts, 1988). In the absence of substantive government
action to help fight the AIDS epidemic in the gay community, gay and lesbian organizations mobilized
themselves to meet the needs of those directly a↵ected by AIDS (Chauncey, 2005, 41). The Gay Men’s
Health Crisis was founded in New York in 1982 and organizers in California established similar organizations
in San Francisco and Los Angeles (Chauncey, 2005, 42). Volunteers served as “buddies” that would help
with chores and work with doctors on behalf of the patient (Chauncey, 2005, 42). Lesbians brought their
experience in the women’s health movement to the inchoate AIDS organizations (Chauncey, 2005, 42). ACT
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UP, the Aids Coalition to Unleash Power, was among the more militant organizations (Shilts, 1988; Eaklor,
2008, 177). The organization was co-founded by the playwright Larry Kramer when he left the leadership of
the Gay Men’s Health Clinic (Shilts, 1988; Eaklor, 2008, 177). ACT UP shut down Wall Street, made public
demonstrations at Yankee Stadium and swarmed the campuses of the NIH to protest their lackadaisical
approach to AIDS research (Chauncey, 2005, 44). The e↵orts of AIDS activists forced the media to reassess
their coverage of the crisis, which created a more favorable image of gay men and gave the epidemic a human
face (Chauncey, 2005, 46).
One of the e↵ects of the New Right’s assault on gay rights and the severity of the AIDS epidemic was
the continuation of the mass movement to come out to friends and family that had started in the 1960s
(Chauncey, 2005, 47). Polling data tells a remarkable story. In 1985 just one fourth of Americans reported
having a gay or lesbian friend, coworker or relative (Chauncey, 2005, 48). By 2000 the same statistic had
tripled (Chauncey, 2005, 48). This mass coming out drastically increased the visibility and acceptance of
gay and lesbian people (Chauncey, 2005, 47). The importance of this shift in visibility is highlighted by
the growth of Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG), an organization that started in 1973 to
support those supporting gay and lesbian people (Chauncey, 2005, 48; Eaklor, 2008, 185). The organization
encouraged straight people to “come out” in support of gay and lesbian people (Eaklor, 2008, 185).2 By
1998 the organization had grown from 20 parents meeting in a Greenwich Village church into a national
organization boasting 500 chapters and 80,000 members (Chauncey, 2005, 48).
2.5 The Gay and Lesbian World of the 1990s
This increased visibility and acceptance translated into an increased political clout that saw Democratic
politicians begin to show up at gay and lesbian rallies to address a now important constituency (Chauncey,
2005, 48-49). This trend built throughout the latter half of the 1980s into Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential
campaign (Chauncey, 2005, 48-49). At a fundraiser in Los Angeles Clinton promised that gay and lesbian
people were “part of his ‘vision’ for America” and that he would take executive action to end the military’s
discrimination against gay and lesbian people (Chauncey, 2005, 49-50; Eaklor, 2008, 198-99). As a result,
gay and lesbian people contributed more than three million dollars to Clinton’s campaign (Eaklor, 2008,
199) and voted for him in a ratio of more than 7:3 (Chauncey, 2005, 50).
2The organization was founded on the interesting idea that gay and lesbian people did not have a support group built into
the family structure like other minority groups (Eaklor, 2008, 185). For example, racial and ethnic minorities typically have
family members that are the same race or ethnicity and can provide support and guidance (Eaklor, 2008, 185). Gay and lesbian
people, however, were often rejected, or literally disowned by their families, which necessitated PFLAG (Eaklor, 2008, 185).
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Though President Clinton faced backlash on a number of fronts and failed to enact the military reform
he had promised, instead signing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” into law in 1993, the administration did achieve
several victories for gay and lesbian rights (Eaklor, 2008, 202; Chauncey, 2005, 51-52). Clinton became the
first president to appoint gay o cials, nominate an openly gay ambassador and invite gay and lesbian leaders
into the Oval O ce (Chauncey, 2005, 52). He also overturned long standing policy when he issued executive
orders that banned discrimination against gay and lesbian people in the federal government and prohibited
the use of sexual orientation as a criterion for issuing security clearances (Chauncey, 2005, 52).
The movement also reached several achievements outside of the Clinton administration. In 1991 there
were 52 openly gay elected public o cials and 146 by 1998 (Chauncey, 2005, 51). There was also a dramatic
growth in the visibility of gay and lesbian people in popular culture (Chauncey, 2005, 52). Hollywood
released a handful of films with gay characters or themes portrayed in a positive light, including Philadelphia
and The Birdcage. On television, there were thirty-four regular LGBT characters in the 1996-97 season
(Chauncey, 2005, 54). Ellen Degeneres came out that same year, becoming the first title character to do so
(Chauncey, 2005, 54). Chauncey (2005, 54) remarks: “Gay people became a part of the cultural landscape
even for people without openly gay friends.”
This visibility in politics and popular culture translated into a spike in support for gay rights legislation
from 56 percent of Americans in 1977 to 84 percent in 1996 (Chauncey, 2005, 54-55). These successes created
a “palpable impact on people’s lives,” as many gay and lesbian people “participated in a rich and supportive
gay life” (Chauncey, 2005, 57). Chauncey (2005, 57) writes: “Many gay youth, and even many heterosexuals,
found it hard to believe it had ever been di↵erent.”
Marriage equality for gay and lesbian people would not have been possible without the achievements of
gay and lesbian people that fought for visibility and acceptance throughout the post-war period up until the
turn of the 21st century (Chauncey, 2005, 58). Yet, marriage was not even on the radar of the gay and lesbian
movements in the late eighties or even the early nineties (Chauncey, 2005, 58). It would take foundational
changes to the institution of marriage and devastating events in the gay and lesbian communities to make
same-sex marriage equality an objective of the movements in the 21st century (Chauncey, 2005).
2.6 How Marriage Changed
Before marriage equality became a central objective of the gay and lesbian movements, the nature of het-
erosexual marriage was changing in fundamental ways. Without the changes to marriage and the social
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context that surrounds it, marriage equality might have never become an objective of the gay and lesbian
movements (Chauncey, 2005, 59). Chauncey (2005, 59-60) identifies the right to choose one’s own spouse, a
decline in the di↵erence between the marital roles of husband and wife, the increasing ability of marriage to
confer rights and benefits and the decline of singular religious control over the rules of marriage as significant
prerequisites for the gay and lesbian movements’ adoption of marriage as an objective.
2.6.1 The Right to Choose
Because slaves had no legal standing to enter into a contract they were forbidden from marrying, but their
emancipation created concerns, among white people, that freed slaves would marry white women (Chauncey,
2005, 61-62). In response, statehouses around the nation voted to make interracial marriage illegal: by 1913
there were 41 states had bans on interracial marriage and there were calls from congress to pass federal
restrictions (Chauncey, 2005, 62-63). It was not until bans on interracial marriage were juxtaposed with
the Nazi prohibition of inter-faith marriages involving Jews that the tides began to turn in favor of an
uninhibited right to choose one’s partner (Chauncey, 2005, 64). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
unanimously adopted in 1948, proclaimed that “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family” (United Nations, 1948). Nearly
two decades later, the Supreme Court unanimously a rmed one’s right to choose their own partner in the
case of Loving v Virginia (Chauncey, 2005, 64-65). In the opinion, Supreme Justice Warren writes that
“Under our constitution, the freedom to marry, or not to marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the state.” The decision in Loving v Virginia was cited as precedent
in the Massachusetts supreme court case that legalized same-sex marriage across the state (Chauncey, 2005,
65).
2.6.2 Changing Marital Roles for Husband and Wife
While it is clear that a husband and wife will experience very di↵erent lives, Chauncey (2005, 70) argues that
many of the inequalities are no longer reinforced by law. Two centuries ago, marriage absorbed a woman’s
life into her husband’s: she could no longer enter into contracts and her property became her husband’s
property (Chauncey, 2005, 67). The feminist movement of the 1970s won major battles to improve the legal
standing and experience of married women and as a result men and women are largely seen as equals under
the eyes of the law (Chauncey, 2005, 69). That is not to say that absolute equality between husbands and
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wives has been achieved, but the marital disparities between the duties of men and women were no longer
structured by law (Chauncey, 2005, 70). Though many consequences of the legal structure of marriage
remain, the opportunity for husband’s and wives to negotiate their own roles in the relationship has led
many di↵erent-sex couples to resemble gay and lesbian couples in that their roles are not assigned by gender
(Chauncey, 2005, 70). Chauncey (2005, 71) writes: “This change makes the idea that marriage can only
consist of a man and woman no longer appear as obvious or necessary to many people as it once did.”
2.6.3 Marriage Granted Access to Rights and Benefits
Because the United States social welfare system is largely entrusted to the private sector, access to many
benefits is contingent on marriage or employment, which made marriage equality more desirable to gay
and lesbian people and heightened the stakes of the marriage debate (Chauncey, 2005, 71). The United
States insurance system is premised on the assumption that most Americans would either be working or be
the wife or child of someone who was working, making it expensive to diverge from the societal norm of a
heterosexual, male-headed household. (Chauncey, 2005, 72). The rights that gay and lesbian people could
not access because they could not marry were tightly interwoven into the fabric of the public and private
benefits systems (Chauncey, 2005, 72-75). After World War II, the government created the GI Bill of Rights,
but access to pensions, educational assistance and job services were only available to the spouses of veterans
(Chauncey, 2005, 73). The creation of the “joint return” tax filing in 1948 allowed married couples to pool
their income and significantly lowered the tax burden for many married men (Chauncey, 2005, 73-74).3 In
the private sector, access to health insurance was a major benefit to marriage that gay and lesbian people
could not access (Chauncey, 2005, 75). The maintenance of an unequal access to marriage threatened the
gay and lesbian couples with “impoverishment and insecurity” and they began to take notice (Chauncey,
2005, 77).
2.6.4 Decline of Religious Hegemony Over Marriage
The final major change to the institution of marriage that allowed gay and lesbian people to imagine them-
selves participating in it was the decline of religious institutions’ power to impose their own rules (Chauncey,
2005, 77). A common religious argument against the legalization of gay marriage is that marriage is, at its
roots, a religious matter and the church should be allowed to govern marriage as it sees fit (Chauncey,
3Within the traditional family structure of a wage earner and a homemaker, straight couples were usually able to qualify
for a lower tax bracket because (Chauncey, 2005, 75). However, in dual-income households, straight couples who filed jointly
might be placed in a higher tax bracket (Chauncey, 2005, 75).
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2005, 77). This ignores two salient facts about marriage in the United States. First, there is no single reli-
gious perspective on gay marriage and second, marriage in the United States has always been a civil matter
(Chauncey, 2005, 78). The colonizers of New England, themselves religious, declared that marriage was a
civil matter and this same principle was a rmed by all states after the American Revolution (Chauncey,
2005, 80). Moreover, religious institutions were never even able to entirely dictate who members of their
own denomination could and could not marry (Chauncey, 2005, 80-83). Catholics and many Protestant de-
nominations attempted to restrict inter-faith marriage, but couples were still able to legally marry because
marriage was a state matter (Chauncey, 2005, 81). It is true that religious institutions, especially Protestant
sects, were able to influence marriage law around monogamy and permanence, but the diversification of
America has led to the proliferation of many faiths, which makes the moral dominance of any one religion
di cult (Chauncey, 2005, 83). The increasing disconnection between marriage and the religious institutions
that had long oppressed gay and lesbian people made marriage a much more desirable option.
2.7 The Rise of Marriage as an Objective of the Movement
While the changes in the nature of marriage made participation in the institution palatable to gay and
lesbian people, there was a series of events in the latter half of the twentieth century that forced the liberation
movements to confront the glaring inequalities created by the inaccessibility of marriage. It was ultimately
these events that propelled marriage equality to a prominent position among the objectives of the gay and
lesbian movements.
2.7.1 The AIDS Crisis
The AIDS crisis drew attention to the lack of legal recognition a↵orded to gay and lesbian relationships as
gay couples were forced to take up fights against powerful entities that would be unnecessary if they were
allowed to marry (Chauncey, 2005, 96). Because many gay men a✏icted with AIDS were forced to stop
working, they now had to reckon with the lack of national health insurance in the United States (Chauncey,
2005, 96). Moreover, because the vast majority of employers did not provide benefits for unmarried partners,
if one member of a couple were forced to leave work because of AIDS, they were not eligible for insurance
through their partner, a benefit that straight couples take for granted (Badgett, 2003, 80-81). Gay men
also found that their lack of a legally recognized relationship forced hospitals to prioritize the word of their
biological family over that of their partner (Chauncey, 2005, 98). Hospitals often refused visitation to the
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partners of men with AIDS and were not forced to consult or even inform them of treatment (Chauncey,
2005, 98). The funeral arrangements were also delegated to the biological family of the deceased and despite
the expressed wishes of the deceased, ceremonies often took place at the parents’ church in the hometown
that they had fled (Chauncey, 2005, 99). Many parents, who were simultaneously confronted with the news
that their son was dying of AIDS and that he was gay, blamed the partner for turning him gay and infecting
him (Chauncey, 2005, 98-99). The estate of the men that died of AIDS was similarly contested. Even
in instances where a will was present, the biological family successfully contested it by “charging that the
homosexual partner had exerted ‘undue’ influence over their deceased son or daughter” or claiming that
their child was incapacitated by AIDS-related dementia and the will was, therefore, invalid (Chauncey, 2005,
100).
Chauncey (2005, 99) writes: “AIDS raised the emotionally charged question of who counted as family in
the most profound ways.” The AIDS crisis laid bare the negative ramifications that emerged because gay and
lesbian people did not have access to legally recognized relationships (Chauncey, 2005, 99). This realization
created the impetus to fight for legally recognized relationships and the concomitant rights a↵orded to
straight people (Chauncey, 2005, 102). In 1989, the New York supreme court ruled in favor of recognizing
a gay couple as a family, because the informal family relationships deserved recognition (Chauncey, 2005,
102-103). This represented an early turning point in the fight for marriage equality (Chauncey, 2005, 102).
Though the AIDS crisis did not immediately catalyze demands for marriage rights, it would eventually have
a profound and enduring impact on the movement for marriage equality (Chauncey, 2005, 104).
2.7.2 The Lesbian Baby Boom
While gay men and their allies were confronting the issues that arose during the AIDS crisis as a result of
marriage inequality, a growing number of lesbian women and a smaller group of gay men were forced to face
similar legal issues as they attempted to raise children (Chauncey, 2005, 105). The legal issues that arose
during what is known as the “lesbian baby boom” became another impetus to pursue legally recognized
relationships (Chauncey, 2005, 105).
It was not a new phenomenon for gay and lesbian people to parent children. In the 1990s, studies
suggested that between one and nine million children were being raised by a lesbian or gay parent (Chauncey,
2005, 105). The legal issues that emerged during the lesbian baby boom were not new either. The courts
repeatedly took custody away from mothers when they were made aware that a she was lesbian or denied
visitation rights to a gay father (Chauncey, 2005, 106). In one case the judge took custody away from a
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lesbian mother because “it [was] the opinion of this Court that her conduct is immoral” and “renders her an
unfit parent” (Chauncey, 2005, 107). But, these occurrences were more a matter of pure homophobia than
an issue of legally recognized relationships and thus did not have as profound of an impact on the movement
for marriage equality (Chauncey, 2005, 107).
The lesbian baby boom raised several custody issues. Most often, the courts had to determine where to
place a child if their biological mother died (Chauncey, 2005, 108). If a relative of the biological mother
contested the second mother’s right to custody then the mother could lose the right to a relationship with
her child (Chauncey, 2005, 108). The separation of two mothers raised further legal dilemmas. Because the
relationship between the two mothers was not legally recognized and because the non-biological mother had
no legal relationship to the child the biological mother could simply refuse to allow the second mother to
see her child (Chauncey, 2005, 108-109). Chauncey (2005, 110) writes: “The lesbian baby boom, as much
as AIDS, led growing numbers of lesbians and gay men to start thinking the unthinkable.”
2.8 The Push for Marriage Equality
The first e↵orts to secure marriage rights came well before the turn of the 21st century. In 1970, Michael
McConnell and Jack Baker applied for a marriage license in Minneapolis and Marjorie Jones and Tracy
Knight filed for a marriage license in Louisville (Eaklor, 2008, 155; Chauncey, 2005, 89-90). Both claims
were denied and the couples eventually sued (Chauncey, 2005, 90; Eaklor, 2008, 155). It was clear from the
outset that both legal challenges were going to fail: in Louisville, the judge found Knight’s beige pantsuit
to be “o↵ensive to the court” and insisted that she leave to change into a dress, saying: “She is a woman,
and she will dress as a woman in this court” (Chauncey, 2005, 91). State legislatures pushed back, as 15
states passed legislation with the specific intention of preventing same-sex marriage (Chauncey, 2005, 91).
These early attempts at marriage equality were not universally applauded. The couples were criticized for
“imitating meaningless, bad habits of our oppressors” (Chauncey, 2005, 93). The gay press encouraged men
to “overcome their sexual shame and to value the diverse pleasures and new friendships made possible by
sexual experimentation with many partners” (Chauncey, 2005, 93). Most lesbian feminists were opposed on
the grounds that the institution of marriage was inextricably tied to the patriarchal domination of women
(Chauncey, 2005, 93). The early e↵orts to pressure for marriage equality faded, but the same debates would
be reignited in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Despite the changes that the institution of marriage underwent in the 20th century and the lessons of
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the AIDS crisis and the lesbian baby boom there was still a lively debate about whether marriage should be
the primary objective of the movement that intensified in the mid-1990s when a series of court rulings made
marriage equality seem within reach (Chauncey, 2005, 119-120).
The lesbian feminists were particularly divided over whether or not to push for marriage equality. Nancy
Poliko↵ argued that the gay and lesbian movements should seek alternatives to marriage that bestowed many
of the rights of marriage without the unsavory association to marriage, which they saw as “inescapably linked
to its historic role as a central institution perpetuating male domination over women” (Chauncey, 2005, 120).
The activist Nan Hunter saw marriage as a less concrete institution that had profoundly changed throughout
the 20th century and would change again when gay and lesbian people were allowed to participate (Chauncey,
2005, 120). Another group pointed out that domestic partnership rights alone would “create a second-class
status rather than an alternative, leaving lesbian and gay couples still excluded from marriage by force of
state law,” because “in no sense, without a marriage option available, could they be assumed to be ‘choosing’
partnership” (Chauncey, 2005, 120).
A similarly divided debate took place among gay activists. The AIDS crisis led some gay men to challenge
the sexual ethic that emerged during the sexual revolution in favor of monogamous marriage (Chauncey,
2005, 121). Others, however, rejected the move towards romantic conservatism because marriage as a central
goal would undermine the “innovative forms of intimacy that had taken shape in queer culture” (Chauncey,
2005, 121). Michael Powell wrote in the Washington Post that many gay activists “[wondered] what happened
to championing sexual freedom and universal health care, and upending patriarchy?” (Eaklor, 2008, 241).
William Dobbs told Powell that the movement “‘had become about lusting for weddings and lavender picket
fences” (Eaklor, 2008, 241)
Nevertheless, several couples across the United States concluded that the right to choose to marry out-
weighed fears of assimilation. Serious legal challenges against the illegality of same-sex marriage began in the
1990s when three same-sex couples in Hawaii came remarkably close to winning marriage equality (Chauncey,
2005, 124-125). The Hawaiian Supreme Court found that the gay marriage ban violated the state’s Equal
Rights Amendment and sent the case back down to the trial could to determine whether or not there was a
“compelling state interest” in upholding the same-sex marriage ban (Chauncey, 2005, 125). However, amid
the fervor of the Hawaii ruling the United States congress passed and President Clinton signed the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) out of fear that Hawaii might legalize same-sex marriage (Chauncey, 2005, 125). The
most important stipulation of the DOMA was the federal definition of marriage as the “union of one man and
one woman” (Chauncey, 2005, 125). The act also allowed states to refuse recognition of same-sex couples
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married in other states and denied federal benefits to those couples (Chauncey, 2005, 125). The DOMA was
ultimately protecting against something that never occurred as the Hawaiian voters passed a constitutional
amendment by a 69% to 29% margin in 1998 to maintain the same-sex marriage ban (Chauncey, 2005, 126).
A similar constitutional amendment was passed the same year in Alaska and 15 other “state DOMAs” were
passed in 1996 (Chauncey, 2005, 126).
In 1997 the Vermont Freedom to Marry Task Force challenged the same-sex marriage ban on behalf of
three same-sex couples to the State Supreme Court which found denying marital rights to same-sex couples
to be unconstitutional (Chauncey, 2005, 128). In response state congress passed legislation that established
“civil unions” that would mimic some of the legal benefits to marriage (Chauncey, 2005, 129). Recourse
to legally recognized relationships like civil unions would have been a major victory a decade earlier but
the outcome was disappointing (Chauncey, 2005, 129). In 2001, another legal challenge, Goodridge v. Mas-
sachusetts, began working its way through the judicial system (Chauncey, 2005, 129). Hillary and Julie
Goodridge, represented by an attorney from GLAD, argued that exclusion from marriage violated Mas-
sachusetts’ constitutional guarantee of equality, while the state “repeated the usual conservative arguments
made against same-sex marriage” (Chauncey, 2005, 130).
While the Massachusetts State Supreme Court was deliberating the gay and lesbian movements won a
major victory as the United States Supreme Court ruled to overturn sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas
in 2003 (Oyez, b). Houston police had entered John Lawrence’s home responding to an unrelated call and
found Lawrence engaging in consensual sodomy with another adult man (Oyez, b). The pair were arrested
and later convicted of “deviate sexual intercourse” (Oyez, b). In 1986 the court had ruled oppositely in
Bowers v. Hardwick and Justice White wrote in the majority opinion “that a right to engage in [sodomy]
is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is,
at best, facetious” (Oyez, a). The victory in Lawrence was partially symbolic. Canaday (2008) suggests
that nobody in the “predominantly queer group” she was with when the ruling came down “thought it even
remotely possible that they might be arrested (under these basically unenforced laws) for consensual sexual
activity with an adult member of the same sex.” Yet, the illegality of sodomy remained a key justification
for a broader array of discrimination against gay men and lesbians (Canaday, 2008).
That same year, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in favor of Goodridge and Massachusetts became
the first state to legalize same-sex marriage as the commonwealth had “failed to identify any constitutionally
adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples” (Chauncey, 2005, 134-135). Instead of giving
the state legislature the opportunity to o↵er civil unions instead of same-sex marriage as had happened in
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Vermont, the Massachusetts Supreme Court mandated that the state begin issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples 180 days later (Chauncey, 2005, 135). By 2009 five states had legalized same-sex marriage
including New Hampshire and Vermont which became the first states to do so legislatively (Pew Research
Center, 2015, Jan.). Maine, Maryland and Washington became the first three states to legalize marriage
by popular vote in 2013 (Pew Research Center, 2015, Jan.). By 2015, there were only 15 states that had
not yet legalized gay marriage (Figure 2.8) (Pew Research Center, 2015, Jan.). Finally, in June of 2015,
the Supreme Court of the United States issued a ruling in the case of Obergefell v. Hodges that legalized
marriage nationwide.
Figure 2.1: This figure depicts the states in which same-sex marriage was legal prior to 2015 and the type
of legalization (judicial, legislative or popular vote)
2.9 The Economic Benefits of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples
Marriage provides a number of economic benefits that gay and lesbian people can now access by the simple
uttering of the words “I do.” Badgett (2009b) quotes from a 2004 report produced by the United States
General Accounting O ce that found that there are “a total of 1,138 federal statutory provisions classified
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to the United States Code in which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and
privileges.” It is almost certain that these do not all represent “benefits” in the strict definition of the word,
but they do amount to an acknowledgment by the federal government that its own laws provided benefits
to straight couples, that were not available to gay couples until 2015 (Badgett, 2009b). Nor do these federal
laws represent the full gamut of economic benefits to marriage for gay and lesbian people. Badgett (2009b)
points out that marriage derives a number of its direct economic benefits from state law and corporate
bylaws.
Writing before the Obergefell decision, Badgett (2009b) argues that maintaining federal marriage in-
equality was tantamount to depriving same-sex couples of a number of direct benefits to marriage. Access
to health care was chief among these concerns. Employers are the most common source of health insurance
for Americans (Badgett, 2009b). While most employers extended health insurance coverage to the married
spouses of workers, most gay and lesbian people could not access this benefit because of the legal barriers to
marriage (Badgett, 2009b). Though some employers had begun to o↵er coverage to the domestic partners
of gay and lesbian employees prior to the Obergefell decision, these programs were only available in 40%
of firms in 2017 (Carpenter et al., 2018). Carpenter et al. (2018) estimate that legal access to same-sex
marriage increases the rate of gay men who are insured by 4.2%. However, Carpenter et al. (2018) find that
legal access to same-sex marriage does not create any significant improvement in various health outcomes
among gay men. They suggest that this may be due to the recency of legalization in many states and the
need for more time to pass for the health benefits of same-sex marriage legalization to take e↵ect (Carpenter
et al., 2018). Lesbian women, however, see no such increase in rates of insurance, nor in health outcomes
(Carpenter et al., 2018). Badgett (2009b) also considers the federal tax benefits of marriage. Using data
from the 2005-2007 American Community Survey, Badgett (2009b) found that 66% of same-sex couples in
Massachusetts would have paid less had they been able to avail themselves of the “married-filing-jointly”
status on their federal taxes. The savings amounted to an average of $2, 325. Badgett (2009b) also found
that marriage provided benefits towards the estate tax, in social security benefits and even in citizenship
preferences.
Marriage equality also has several social, historical and symbolic e↵ects that I expect will lead to economic
benefits for gay and lesbian people. Access to marriage might normalize being gay or lesbian to the rest of
society. Garretson (2018) argues that gay people coming out to their family and friends paved the path to
the current state of gay and lesbian rights because it demonstrated that homosexual people were not the
caricature they had been imagined to be. Because marriage is a public act, it would seem that marriage
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equality would increase the visibility of gay and lesbian people and contribute to greater normalization.
Badgett (2009c, 135) believes that “marriage will eventually blur the line between what it means to be
heterosexual and what it means to be gay or lesbian.” This might decrease the extent of discrimination
against gay and lesbian people.4
In addition to her argument about the direct benefits of marriage, Badgett (2009b, 1100) also describes
a host of economic benefits that accrue to same-sex married couples, not because they are codified into
law, but because “marriage provides a legal framework for living an interdependent economic life.” Badgett
(2009b) asserts that marriage reduces transaction costs because married couples no longer need to renegotiate
the legal terms of the relationship as circumstances change. Marriage can also provide social insurance
because married couples typically pool their earnings and promote care labor through long-term relationships
(Badgett, 2009b). However, in listing these indirect benefits, Badgett (2009b) reveals the assumption that
married gay and lesbian couples will behave like their di↵erent-sex counterparts in the way that they approach
marriage.
The legalization of same-sex marriage nationwide also raises questions of the “marriage premium” that has
long been observed for straight men and whether or not same-sex couples will experience similar premiums.
This question is significant for several reasons. Estimates of the wage di↵erence between observably similar
gay and straight men range from 2% to 32% (Badgett, 2009a). Allegretto and Arthur (2001, 643) suggest
that if a marriage premium exists for gay men, then it might represent a large portion of the wage gap
between straight and gay men, writing that “if all the homosexuals are in ‘marital type’ relationships,
theoretically they may be penalized [by anti-gay wage discrimination] by an amount equal to the full premium
for being married.” That is, the wage di↵erence between gay and straight men may be driven by the marriage
premium. There is some evidence of this in the literature. Using a sample of straight men and unmarried
gay men, Zavodney (2007) finds that including a marriage control variable decreases the wage di↵erence
from a statistically significant 15% to a statistically insignificant wage gap of less than 4%. Second, the
marriage premium has massive implications for gay men as well as lesbian women because of the heightened
threat of poverty among LGB people. Using three di↵erent data sets, Badgett et al. (2013) find that gay,
lesbian and bisexual people have higher rates of poverty than their heterosexual counterparts. Within the
gay, lesbian and bisexual subgroups, women are consistently more likely to be impoverished (Badgett et al.,
2013). If the wage e↵ects of marriage are positive for gay and lesbian people, then this could provide an
4It is important to note that this normalization would likely benefit most or all gay and lesbian people, not just those that
marry and also that these changes would not be immediate.
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important earnings boost to impoverished homosexual people. However, there is also the possibility that
there is a marriage penalty for gay and lesbian people, which might further impoverish groups that are
already economically and socially vulnerable. While it is possible that gay and lesbian couples might benefit
from a similar marriage premium, two significant questions on the topic remain to be answered that do not
have obvious conclusions: What drives the marriage premium for straight men? And, can gay and lesbian
people expect to benefit from the same mechanism as straight men? As I discuss in the following sections,
answering these questions raises further questions about the way that gay and lesbian couples behave in the
labor market and organize their households before and after marriage.
Chapter 3
Theoretical Framework
3.1 Marriage Premiums for Straight Men
The large and significant wage premium for married straight men is a well documented phenomenon in the
labor economics literature. Though the extent of the premium varies by study, Korenman and Neumark
(1991) place the typical earnings di↵erential for straight married men between 10 and 40%. There are three
main explanations for the marriage premium (selection into marriage, household specialization and employer
favoritism) as well as a handful of ancillary theories.
3.1.1 Selection
The argument that selection into marriage drives the marriage premia for straight men relies on the argument
that there are unobserved characteristics, which cannot be controlled for in regression analyses, that make
men more productive and more attractive to straight women as potential spouses. For example, some have
posited a willingness to commit as such a characteristic. Thus, men with these traits would earn more and
also get married at a higher rate than men that do not possess these characteristics, thereby driving the
marriage premium. An important implication of this theory is that men who get married should be more
productive before and after they marry.
Using panel data, Korenman and Neumark (1991) construct a fixed e↵ects model that attempts to net
out constant individual characteristics that influence both marriage and the wage determination process.
They conclude that no more than 20% of the marriage premium is attributable to selection. This result
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mirrors those of other fixed e↵ects models. However, a fixed e↵ects model does not strike at the core of
the selection argument. First, the fixed e↵ects model assumes that the traits that drive selection and the
marriage premium are constant across time. However, it is foreseeable that the relevant characteristics vary
with age, experience and job type. For example, if persistence is a trait that makes men more productive and
more attractive as a potential spouse, it may be the case that persistence is a learned trait and not an inherent
one, suggesting that the e↵ects on productivity would manifest themselves over time and would therefore,
not be adequately captured by the fixed e↵ects model. Moreover, even if the relevant characteristics are
assumed to be constant, applying a fixed e↵ects model makes a flawed assumption about who will marry.
The data used by Korenman and Neumark (1991) only allows them to consider men who marry before or
during their sample period. This may create a downward bias on the estimation of the wage di↵erential.
For example, men who possess the relevant traits and who marry after the time range studied are treated
as unmarried in the fixed e↵ects model, which means that these more productive men are driving the wage
of the unmarried group up.
3.1.2 Household Specialization
The theory of household specialization was pioneered by Gary Becker in A Treatise on the Family. Becker
(1993, 38) begins his analysis with the assumption that men and women are biologically di↵erent: because
women give birth, they are biologically predisposed to care labor, while men focus on market activities.
Thus, Becker (1993, 38) concludes that, even with the same human capital investments, women’s time and
men’s time are not perfect substitutes for one another. That is, women have a comparative advantage over
men in household production, while men have a comparative advantage over women with regard to wage
earning. Therefore, “an e cient household with both sexes would allocate the time of women mainly to the
household sector and the time of men mainly to the market sector.” (Becker, 1993, 38). The extra time that
married men spend working increases their productivity, which leads to a higher wage relative to unmarried
men. Put simply, the specialization hypothesis suggests that marriage makes men more productive, not that
more productive men get married. It is important to note that there are several theories that are at odds
with Becker’s and still come to the conclusion that members of a household will specialize.1
Korenman and Neumark (1991, 293) correctly point out, however, that there is no reason to believe
that the sexual division of labor and the concomitant wage benefits “are reaped upon the utterance of the
1In particular, it is possible to arrive at household specialization without assuming biological di↵erences in the ability of a
sex to earn wages.
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words ‘I do.’”2 Following this notion, Korenman and Neumark (1991) include measurements of the length of
marriage as well as its square in their analysis of the straight marriage premium. They find evidence that,
on average, an additional year of marriage is associated with higher incomes relative to men who have never
married. While this is consistent with Becker’s description of household specialization, it is not conclusive.
For example, because of social expectations that a husband is supposed to provide for his family, married
men may gradually change their attitude towards work, making them more productive. This would result in
a marriage premium, but it would not be connected to the state of household specialization. Additionally,
Korenman and Neumark (1991) find a significant, though slightly smaller premium for divorced men relative
to men who have never married. This would seem to be at odds with Becker’s conclusion. If it is the
household dynamics of marriage that make men more productive, then that boost in productivity should not
be present after the marriage has ended.3 Korenman and Neumark (1991) find evidence that marriage does
increase men’s wages, but their analysis lacks a link to household specialization and therefore, their study
cannot directly test Becker’s hypothesis. That is, without analyzing the division of time for both members
of married and unmarried couples, their study lacks a concrete link between the household specialization
and the labor market.
Other studies have attempted to draw a more direct relationship between household specialization and
the marriage premium for straight men. Loh (1996) presents evidence that is at odds with the specialization
conclusion, finding positive, yet insignificant coe cients for men whose wives work. His logic suggests that
as a man’s wife allocates more of her time to the labor market, her household labor and thereby the increased
productivity that creates the marriage premium will dissipate. However, the measures of the wives’ time
in the labor market raises questions about the reliability of the measure. The study uses weeks worked per
year and then codifies those measures into the number of years worked over the course of the marriage,
and consequently falls short of estimating the desired impact. Though the number of weeks worked may
proxy for labor market time, it is possible that women are not working enough each week to substantially
a↵ect the productivity their husbands receive from the division of household labor. Moreover, Loh’s evidence
against specialization is not dispositive because wives could be rearranging their time allocation so that the
2There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. For example, married couples may not actually discuss their
respective comparative advantages when considering how they should divide their household labor. As such, the “e cient”
division of labor may take time to realize. Additionally, even if married couples immediately began the optimal division of
household labor, the mechanism by which the wage structure changes would not allow married men to be immediately rewarded
for their increased productivity. They may have to ask for a raise, or wait for their additional productivity to be noticed by
management.
3This might be explained away by relaxing some of the assumptions in Becker’s model. For example, raises are rarely
rescinded, so wage gains made during marriage might be resilient in the face of decreased productivity from the dissolution of
a marriage.
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time they spend in the labor market is o↵set by reducing leisure time, rather than decreasing time spent in
household production. However, Loh (1996) also reports that the wife’s educational attainment has a large
and statistically significant e↵ect on her husband’s earnings. This also does not provide conclusive evidence
against household specialization because it is unclear whether these better educated women are allocating
more time to the labor market than their less educated peers. Being more educated does not mean that
women are spending less time in household labor.
One study attempted to make a direct connection between specialization and the marriage premium.
Hersch and Stratton (2000) proxy household specialization by controlling for nine di↵erent varieties of non-
market work, which they classify into traditionally male, traditionally female and neutral housework. Their
hypothesis suggests that as men increase the amount of time they spend in household work, their market
labor, and consequently their wage should decrease. However, they find that there is little di↵erence in the
total amount of time that married men and never married men spend on household work, but the composition
of that work is varied.4 Hersch and Stratton (2000) estimate fixed e↵ects model, in which they find that
including variables for the three categories of housework decreases the marital status coe cient from .090 to
.087, but the coe cient is still significant at 5%. Moreover, the coe cients for the housework variables are
insignificant. The paper concludes that “If neither selection nor specialization explains the di↵erentials, then
more attention should be paid to alternative explanations” such as “preferential treatment from employers”
or the notion that “men may become better workers because of the stability induced by marriage.” But, the
central claim of their argument is flawed. It is not necessary that men take time away from the labor market
to perform house work. For example, married men may allocate less time to leisure in order to spend more
time on household duties. Without a measure of time spent in leisure, it is di cult to develop a full picture
of men’s housework and to determine whether or not household specialization is occurring.
3.1.3 Employer Favoritism
The third prominent explanation of the straight marriage premium is that there are no productivity di↵er-
entials between married and unmarried men. Instead, the wage premium is driven by favoritism for married
men or discrimination against unmarried men. These theories seem to have fallen out of favor in the lit-
erature, as there is little empirical research investigating their claims. In one prominent study, Loh (1996)
attempts to illustrate the existence of employer favoritism by analyzing the wage e↵ects of marriage among
4Never married men tend to spend more time on typically female housework while married men spend more time on typically
male housework.
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self-employed workers. The theory suggests that if marriage is associated with a productivity di↵erential
before or after a man is married, then self-employed workers should benefit from the same productivity
di↵erentials and earn more. Loh (1996) admits that this logic rests on the assumption that the wage de-
termination is similar for both categories of workers, a matter on which there is no consensus. In all three
of his models (OLS, fixed e↵ects and self-selection) Loh (1996) finds that married self-employed workers
experience a large and significant wage penalty relative to never married self-employed workers, a result that
gives credence to the employer favoritism explanation of the marriage premium.
3.2 Theoretical Wage E↵ects of Marriage in Same-Sex Households
The application of the main theories of the straight marriage premium to same-sex couples is not a straight-
forward practice because there are several di↵erences in the household behavior, matching patterns, discrim-
ination faced and other economic traits of homosexual and heterosexual people.
3.2.1 Selection
If selection drives the marriage premium for straight men, then it is possible that lesbian and gay men
may experience a similar wage premium. If gay and lesbian people are attracted to the same traits in a
potential spouse as are straight women, including the traits that make straight men more productive, then
gay and lesbians who possess these traits would be married at a higher rate, and we would expect gay and
lesbian people to earn a wage premium similar to that experienced by married straight men. There is some
evidence that gay and lesbian people have di↵erent matching patterns than straight people (Jepsen and
Jepsen, 2002). However, it remains unclear whether this is an indication that gay men and lesbians are not
attracted to the relevant traits that might propel the straight marriage premium. Applying the selection
argument to same-sex marriage also raises the question of the di↵erences in occupation and industry that
prevail between gay and lesbian people and their heterosexual counterparts. Antecol et al. (2008) finds that
lesbians are more concentrated in male-dominated occupations than are straight women and that gay men
are more concentrated in occupations dominated by women than are straight men are. It is possible that
the characteristics that drive straight men’s selection into marriage creates productivity di↵erentials that are
unique to male-dominated occupations. In this instance, we might expect to observe a marriage premium
for lesbians and no e↵ect of marriage for gay men.
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Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) present evidence that gay and lesbian people participate in positive assortative
mating to a greater degree than di↵erent-sex couples. This would suggest that, if the straight marriage
premium is driven by selection that applies to same-sex couples, then the empirical results should show a
marriage premium for both partners that is similar in magnitude and direction. The convincing evidence
found by Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) suggests that gay and lesbian people are more likely to be similar to their
partner in a number of respects. However, because it is unclear which traits drive the marriage premium
under theories of selection, it is di cult whether same-sex couples will also be more similar with regard to
those traits Jepsen and Jepsen (2002).
3.2.2 Household Specialization
Though most of his analysis focuses on di↵erent-sex households, Gary Becker (1993) briefly addresses same-
sex households in A Treatise on the Family. Becker suggests that because households with two members
of the same sex do not have the comparative advantages experienced by straight households, they will not
benefit from the concomitant increase in productivity: “Households with only men or only women are less
e cient because they are unable to profit from the sexual division of labor” (Becker, 1993, 38-39). This,
however, is based on the faulty assumption that a same-sex couple would consist of two identical men or
women and that neither would, therefore, have any comparative advantage in wage earning or household
production. This is, of course, an unrealistic assumption, a fact that undermines the conclusion of Becker’s
argument. If there is any di↵erence in the comparative advantage of two partners with respect to wage
earning or household production, which there certainly is, then I would still expect to observe more inter-
household specialization among gay and lesbian people who are married relative to unmarried gay men and
lesbians.
While empirical research directly analyzing the inter-household specialization theory in same-sex house-
holds is non-existent, there is a growing body of research on the household organization of same-sex couples
that can provide some insight. Martell and Roncolato (2016) compare three categories of non-labor market
time use of cohabiting gay and lesbian people to married and cohabiting heterosexual couples (household
labor, care labor and leisure). Over the whole sample, Martell and Roncolato (2016) find that gay men spend
significantly more time in household labor and more than an hour less on care labor than married straight
men. Relative to cohabiting straight men, gay men are statistically indistinguishable in their non-labor mar-
ket time use. This changes when the sample is separated into men with and without children. The di↵erence
in time spent on household labor between cohabiting gay men and married straight men increases more
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than three-fold and remains significant, while the di↵erence in care labor becomes positive but insignificant.
Relative to cohabiting straight men with children, gay men with children spend more than an hour and
a half more time on household labor. When looking only at men without children, gay men’s time use is
statistically indistinguishable from that of both straight married men and straight cohabiting men.
These results provide some evidence to support Becker’s hypothesis that gay men will spend more time in
household labor and will therefore not benefit from the same marriage premium as straight men. However,
these findings were only robust in the sub-sample of men with children. This suggests that gay men without
children, whose non-labor market time use is statistically indistinguishable from both categories of straight
men should experience the same premium, while gay men with children will not benefit from a marriage
premium. The separation of the sample by parenthood is especially telling because gay men are less likely
to have children from accidental pregnancies.5 Because a gay couple has to choose to have a child, which
is expensive, it is reasonable to expect that they will not choose to do so until they are in a stable and
committed relationship that is not at risk of dissolution. In other words, gay men may wait to have children
until they have formed a “marriage-like” relationship, meaning that the sample of gay men with children
may provide evidence into the structure of gay marriages.
The results for lesbian women are less clear. Over the whole sample, lesbian women spend significantly
less time in care labor than married straight women and more than cohabiting straight women. However,
when the sample is restricted to women with children, there is no di↵erence in any of the time use categories
between lesbian and straight married women, but lesbian women with children do spend significantly more
time on care labor than cohabiting women. Lesbian women without children do not have significantly
di↵erent time use patterns from straight married women without children.
The results found by Martell and Roncolato (2016) for lesbian women run contrary to Becker’s specializa-
tion hypothesis which suggests that partnered lesbian women should spend less time on non-market activities
because she is living with someone with a similar predisposition towards non-market labor. If household
specialization drives the marriage premium for straight men and lesbian women carry this same pattern of
household labor into marriage, then we would not expect them experience a marriage premium.
Giddings et al. (2014) estimate the specialization gap between unmarried gay and lesbian couples and
married and unmarried straight couples by birth cohort, using three measures of household specialization (the
probability that both partners work, the probability that both partners work full time and the absolute value
5It is not uncommon for gay men to have children from previous relationships with women, so it is incorrect to claim that
they cannot have accidental pregnancies.
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of the di↵erence in hours worked per week) and arrives at similar results to Martell and Roncolato (2016).
Without controlling for children at all, they find that both married and unmarried straight couples specialize
more than same-sex couples in all three measures and across all birth cohorts. However, the specialization
gap appears to be narrowing in younger birth cohorts. Looking only at the subset of couples with children,
Giddings et al. (2014) find that the specialization gap narrows for all birth cohorts when children are
controlled for and, with the exception of lesbian couples and married couples, disappears altogether in the
younger cohorts when the sample is partitioned to only include couples with children. Lesbian couples
with children specialize less than straight married couples with children using two of the three measures of
specialization (probability both partners work part time and the absolute value of the di↵erence in hours
worked per week). While this study does suggest that gay and lesbian couples might specialize less than
straight couples, it does not address the e↵ects of marriage on household specialization. Moreover, it is
conceivable that the disparities in household specialization between same-sex and di↵erent-sex couples could
narrow as gay and lesbian couples have time to establish institutional patterns for the way that they behave
in marriage.
If Becker (1993, 38-39) is correct in his a assertion that same-sex households will not benefit from
household specialization, then the empirical results should show no increase in the wages of either partner.
However, this conclusion is based on a faulty assumption, which suggests that gay and lesbian couples
might specialize more after marriage. For di↵erent-sex couples, the specialization hypothesis suggests that
one partner, the male, will specialize in wage earning, while the other partner, the female, specializes in
household production. Therefore, if marriage does induce gay and lesbian couples to specialize more, then
I would expect the empirical results to show that one partner benefits from a marriage premium while the
other partner experiences a wage decrease or no change. However, it is not necessarily the case that both
partners cannot experience a marriage premium because this assumes that the scale of labor market work
and housework is remaining constant. Therefore, a pattern of results would still be consistent with the
specialization explanation if both partners experience a marriage premium, but I would expect marriage to
have di↵ering e↵ects on either partner. That is, the partner who specializes in wage earning should have a
larger premium than the partner who specializes in household production. This leaves the question of how
gay men and lesbian women might organize their inter-household specialization. That is, which member
of the household specializes in labor market activity, and which specializes in household production. For
di↵erent-sex couples, there are centuries of reinforced social norms about which member of the household
should work and which should specialize in household production. Without this social framework for gay and
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lesbian couples, I turn to Becker (1993, 38), who provides some theoretical insight. Under Becker’s theory,
women specialize in household labor because they have a comparative advantage relative to men and vice
versa for wage earning. I suspect that, within gay and lesbian households, the primary earner might have
a comparative advantage relative to the secondary earner. Therefore, if specialization drives the marriage
premium, I expect that the empirical results will show a larger e↵ect for primary earners than their secondary
earning counterparts.
3.2.3 Employer Favoritism
If employer favoritism drives the straight marriage premium, then there are significant holes in the empirical
research that make it di cult to determine the theoretical wage e↵ects of marriage in same-sex households.
For example, if discrimination against unmarried men creates the marriage premium, it is di cult to predict
how marriage will a↵ect the wages of gay men and lesbians because there is no indication of how sexual
orientation interacts with marriage in the mind of the discriminator. It is possible that marriage may
decrease the wages of gay and lesbian people because a discriminatory employer is more discriminatory
against married gay men because they are morally or politically opposed to gay marriage. However, it is also
conceivable that marriage could tamper potential employers’ negative stereotypes of gay and lesbian people.
That is, there are wide spread stereotypes of promiscuity in the gay community, but the stigma associated
with this stereotype might be mitigated by marriage, which has social connotations of monogamy.
It is also possible that same-sex marriage provides the necessary information for employers to discrim-
inate against gay men. Because, unlike race or gender, sexual orientation is not concretely connected to
appearance or manner of behavior, it is possible that employers are not able to discriminate to their desired
extent. Marriage, however, is a public act and may indicate to an employer that someone is gay or lesbian.
Discriminatory employers might be able to more accurately identify gay and lesbian people in same-sex mar-
riages, which may result in a marriage penalty for gay and lesbian people. It is less likely that discrimination
from clients or customers will a↵ect the relative wages of married and unmarried gay and lesbian people
because it is unlikely that a client or customer will be aware of someone’s marital status. That is, clients
and customers are unlikely to know whether the gay or lesbian person serving them is married or unmarried.
It is ambiguous what pattern of empirical results would be consistent with employer favoritism driving
the straight marriage premium. It would seem that employer favoritism for marriage is not driven purely
by marriage, but by the intersection of marriage and being a man. Thus, it would seem that we should not
observe any e↵ect of marriage on wages among lesbian women. However, if employers are partial to married
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men because of the intersection of marriage and masculinity then stereotypes of lesbian masculinity and gay
femininity would reverse the empirical estimates of the benefits of marriage. A third potentiality exists in
which employers pay married men more because of the social expectation that a husband is supposed to
financially support his wife and children. The prominent “double income, no kids” stereotype of gay and
lesbian couples could mean that employers see no such reason to compensate gay and lesbian employees
using the same wage structure as married straight men, which would be reflected in the empirical results by
a null e↵ect for gay men and lesbian women.
3.2.4 Social and Economic Vulnerability
Lesbians and, to a lesser extent, gay men are socially and economically vulnerable populations because of
the possibility for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and, for lesbians, their sex. Martell
(2019) and Badgett (1995) suggest that lesbian’s greater investment in education, labor market attachment
and representation in typically male occupations and industries relative to straight women might be an
attempt to cope with the vulnerability created by their sex and sexual orientation. Thus, it is possible that
marriage may reduce the vulnerability of lesbian couples by any number of mechanisms, which might lead
to a decrease in the labor market attachment of married lesbian women and, therefore, a wage decrease.
Because vulnerability likely a↵ects lesbian women in similar ways, it would be supported by empirical results
that estimate a negative e↵ect of marriage for both partners in lesbian couples.
3.2.5 Conclusion
The wage e↵ects of marriage in same-sex households pose a theoretically ambiguous question. The growing
body of economic literature on gay men and lesbians provides evidence that would suggest that there is
no marriage premium if household specialization drives the marriage premium and a premium similar to
straight men if the selection hypothesis is correct. Moreover, it may even be the case that marriage would
provide the information necessary to discriminate against gay men. These prominent theories paired with
existing economic literature of gay and lesbian couples lend themselves to a number of potentialities of the
wage e↵ects of marriage for gay and lesbian people. Thus, I turn to empirical analyses to more adequately
answer the question of what impact marriage has on the wages of gay and lesbian people.
Chapter 4
Data, Methodology, Results and
Discussion
4.1 Data
I use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2012 through 2017. The ACS is an annual
confidential survey administered by the United States Census Bureau to a representative sample of Americans
from all 50 states (United States Census Bureau, 2016). The ACS has a number of benefits over similar
data sets. Compared to the Community Population Survey (CPS) or the General Social Survey (GSS), the
ACS is very large (United States Census Bureau, 2016). While the CPS has an annual sample size of about
100,000 households, the ACS has approximately 3,000,000 (United States Census Bureau, 2016). Moreover,
the ACS is unique in that response is mandatory (United States Census Bureau, 2018). Though it is unlikely
that it will be imposed, failure to complete the ACS questionnaire can be punished by a fine of up to $5,000
(Rose, 2010). Importantly, the mandate of the ACS increases response rates (United States Census Bureau,
2018).
Like most representative data sets, the ACS has significant limitations in its ability to identify gay and
lesbian people. Notably, the ACS does not provide respondents the opportunity to self-identify their sexual
orientation. I am, however, able to infer the sexual orientation of certain households. The ACS questionnaire
asks that a household head be identified for every response. Every other member of the household is then
identified by their relationship to the household head. Both “Spouse” and “Unmarried Partner” are possible
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relationships to the household head listed on the ACS questionnaire. I can identify married and cohabiting
gay and lesbian couples using the relationship to the household head as well as the sex of the members of
the household. A couple is considered to be gay or lesbian if the “Spouse” or “Unmarried Partner” is the
same sex as the household head. The limitations of the data limit the possible scope of the study in that it is
impossible to identify single or non-cohabiting gay and lesbian people. Thus, the sample I use only contains
people who are living with a spouse or unmarried partner of the same sex.
The practices of the Census Bureau create further limitations. For the 1990 Census, the Census Bureau
assumed that responses indicating a same-sex married couple had been miscoded and changed the sex of one
of the partners (Gates and Steinberger, 2009). Though this clearly flawed practice had ended by the 2000
Census, the Census Bureau instead recoded the relationship to the household head from spouse to unmarried
partner if the response indicated a same-sex married couple (Gates and Steinberger, 2009). As an entity
of the federal government, the Census Bureau interpreted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to mean
that they could not recognize same-sex marriages in the data they produced (O’Connell and Lofquist, 2009).
This same practice was used on the ACS until 2013, well after marriage had been legalized in a number of
states (Gates and Steinberger, 2009). This makes reliable ACS data from the early years of marriage equality
unobtainable. I am, however, able to use data from 2012 because the Census Bureau creates a “flag” for
each question that indicates whether the response has been edited by the Census Bureau. Though these
flags are usually opaque, the Census Bureau specified which observations in the 2012 ACS had their marital
status allocated because it would otherwise indicate a same-sex marriage.1 Using this data flag, I am able
to identify married gay and lesbian couples in the 2012 data set.
Though larger than alternative data sets, the ACS still contains a small sample of people who are
identifiable as gay or lesbian. Statistically, this makes misidentifying someone as a member of a same-sex
couple a potentially serious mistake that could significantly skew the results (Gates and Steinberger, 2009).
Because the process of flagging responses is something of a black box, it is safest to drop those observations,
and their partner or spouse from the data set (Gates and Steinberger, 2009). Thus, I follow the advice of
Gates and Steinberger (2009) and drop all observations for which the sex, relationship to household head or
marital status have been allocated by the Census Bureau.2
The accuracy of the ACS is benefited by the practice of conducting Computer Assisted Telephone In-
1This is the only year that this practice was used because the 2013 ACS was the first to allow same-sex married couples to
identify themselves.
2Observations from the 2012 ACS where the relationship status was allocated by the Census Bureau to correct a same-sex
marriage are still included.
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terviews and Personal Interviews for more than one third of ACS respondents in which they are explicitly
asked to verify the sex of a same-sex spouse or partner (Gates and Steinberger, 2009). This helps prevent
the treatment of “false positives” as bona fide same-sex couples. However, the possibility that respondents
have mistakenly identified a roommate or some other relationship as an “Unmarried Partner” remains. This
is unlikely because the ACS questionnaire lists both “Roomer or Boarder” and “Housemate or Roommate”
as distinct relations to the household head. Moreover, both of these options are listed above “Unmarried
Partner” on the questionnaire.
The ACS has another key limitation that arises from the methodology of the data collection. The ACS
collects data throughout the calendar year and asks respondents to answer questions about the past 12
months of their lives but includes respondents in the ACS data for the year that they responded (Hansen
et al., 2019). That is, a respondent questioned in January of 2015 would be included in the 2015 ACS, but
would respond to the questionnaire based on their experiences from February of 2014 through January of
2015. Therefore, the ACS for any given year will include data that spans 23 months (Hansen et al., 2019).
This makes it particularly di cult to definitively establish which observations are part of the treatment
group with regard to changes to the legal landscape (Hansen et al., 2019). In particular, it is di cult to
discern which observations are living in states where marriage is legal at the time of observation. Taking
2015 as an example, people who were surveyed before June 2015, when the Obergefell decision was handed
down, and who lived in states legally a↵ected by the decision would be counted in the 2015 ACS, but would
be responding to the questionnaire on the basis of information that was una↵ected by Obergefell because the
decision had not been given yet. I attempt to correct for this flaw in the data by determining that someone
is living in a state with legal same-sex marriage if the observation year minus one is greater than the year
that same-sex marriage was legalized.
Because I am looking at the wage di↵erences between two di↵erent subsets of the gay and lesbian pop-
ulations, my sample only includes only gay and lesbian people. This means that everyone in the sample is
either the head of a same-sex household or the spouse or unmarried partner. I only include people that are
between the ages of 25 and 64 because this is the population that is most likely to have a high degree of
labor market attachment. Similarly, I only keep observations who are employed, working 35 hours a week or
more and worked 48 weeks or more in the last 12 months. Again, I do this to achieve the population with
the greatest labor market attachment.
The descriptive statistics for select variables are presented in Table 4.1. The average and standard
deviation for cohabiting gay men are presented in Column (1), and for married gay men in Column (2). The
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Gay Men Lesbian Women
Cohabiting Married Cohabiting Married
Wage 32.86133⇤⇤⇤ 38.84363 25.30556⇤⇤⇤ 30.50987
(30.6027) (36.26015) (21.13301 ) (25.74353)
Earnings 76155.28⇤⇤⇤ 90894.35 57154.41⇤⇤⇤ 69428.16
(76378.04) (91384.23) (52234.77) (64128.73)
Age 42.2847⇤⇤⇤ 46.182 41.56293⇤⇤⇤ 44.4554
(10.82636) (10.07329) (11.47904) (10.82708)
Number of own children in the household .0911481⇤⇤⇤ .361589 .4046575⇤⇤⇤ .601073
(.431591) (.8425774) (.8170735) (.95872)
State has an ENDA=1 .4864154⇤⇤⇤ .5837038 .4356357⇤⇤⇤ .5513322
(.4998323) (.4929677) (.4958578) (.4973806)
No high school diploma or GED=1 .0192139⇤⇤⇤ .0296733 .0230719 .026098
(.1372808) (.1696926) (.1501374) (.1594341)
High dschool diploma or GED=1 .2836918⇤⇤⇤ .2517881 .3074822⇤⇤⇤ .2577976
(.4508042) (.4340611) (.4614674) (.4374419)
Associates degree=1 .0810355 .0786777 .1016316 .0974811
(.2728989) (.2692482) (.302174) (.2966253)
Bachelors degree=1 .3278501⇤⇤⇤ .3021458 .2798821⇤⇤ .2616168
(.4694457) (.4592103) (.4489572) (.439535)
Masters degree=1 .198409⇤⇤⇤ .2416393 .1910443⇤⇤⇤ .2587979
(.3988152) (.4280975) (.393138) (.4379943)
Doctorate=1 .0323603⇤⇤⇤ .0449449 .0306188⇤⇤⇤ .0416477
(.176961) (.2071932) (.1722889) (.1997919)
Black=1 .0443605 .0423352 .0659096 .0623806
(.2059018) (.2013625) (.2481329) (.2418566)
Asian=1 .037484⇤⇤⇤ .0559637 .0232157⇤⇤⇤ .0350095
(.189951) (.2298626) (.1505934) (.1838123)
American Indian=1 .005663 .0057027 .0089125⇤ .0061835
(.0750424) (.0753041) (.0939879) (.0783953)
Other race=1 .0542709 .0518075 .0559908 .0530145
(.2265591) (.2216488) (.2299122) (.2240725)
Hispanic=1 .1260028 .1275855 .1160066 .1107575
(.3318637) (.3336439) (.3202444) (.3138458)
Observations 14833 10346 13913 10997
Note: Asterisk indicates significant di↵erence from married counterpart.
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Standard deviations in parentheses
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same descriptive statistics are listed for cohabiting lesbian women in Column (3) and for married lesbian
women in Column (4). The significance stars indicate a statistically significant di↵erence in the means of
the married and unmarried populations. The descriptive statistics show a significant di↵erence between
the wages and earnings of married and unmarried gay men. Using an unconditional average, married gay
men have wages that are nearly $6 more than the wages of cohabiting gay men while the annual earnings
di↵erence is more than $14,000. There are also disparities in the average age of married and cohabiting gay
men, as well as in the educational attainment and the percentage of Asians. There is a similar pattern for
lesbian women. On average, married lesbian women have higher wages than cohabiting lesbians by more
than $5. The earnings gap between married and unmarried lesbian women is more than $12,000. There are,
again, disparities in the age, number of children, educational attainment and ethnicity of the married and
unmarried samples of lesbian women. Though the wages and earnings are higher for married gay and lesbian
people, this unconditional average is inconclusive because there are significant di↵erences in the makeup of
the married and unmarried sub-samples. Thus, I turn to regression analysis to more adequately address the
matter of the wage e↵ects of marriage in same-sex households.
4.2 Methods
There are key di↵erences in the labor market experiences of men and women, and, more specifically, for gay
and lesbian people, which suggest that the wage e↵ects of marriage might vary for the two groups. Therefore,
I begin by dividing the sample into its gay and lesbian sub-samples. I then estimate an OLS regression of
the following specification for both groups:
ln(wist) =  1Mist +  2Xist + vs +  zst +  t + ✏ist
I use two measurements as the dependent variable, ln(Wage) and ln(Earnings). The ln(Wage) measure-
ment is calculated by dividing the individual’s total wage and salary income in 2012 dollars by the product of
the usual number of hours worked per week and the number of weeks worked in the twelve months. Because
the ACS only reports the number of weeks worked in intervals, I use the midpoint of those intervals. I then
take the natural log of this value. To calculate ln(Earnings) I take the natural log of the total wage and
salary income in 2012 dollars. I use the log of both measures because wages and earnings are log normal.
Mist is an indicator variable for marital status that equals one if the individual is married and equals zero
otherwise.  1, the coe cient of Mist, will indicate the wage e↵ects of marriage for gay and lesbian people
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and is thus the term of interest in this study. Next, I also include a vector of individual characteristics,
Xist, for person i in state s at time t. Following standard practice in labor economics, I include a variable
for age and its square. This will capture diminishing wage returns to age. I expect age to be positive and
age squared to be negative, reflecting diminishing wages as people reach old age, because human capital
theory and a large body of labor economic research suggest that it should. Given the sizable impacts of
children demonstrated by Giddings et al. (2014) and Martell and Roncolato (2016), I add a variable that
indicates the number own children living in the household.3 I expect the number of own children living in
the household to have a positive coe cient, though I expect that the causation is reversed: gay and lesbian
couples with higher wages will be more likely to have children. Raising a child is very expensive and gay
and lesbian couples are less likely to have accidental pregnancies.4 Therefore, I expect that gay and lesbian
couples will wait until they are financially stable to have children, which means that couples with higher
wages will select into parenthood at a higher rate. Xist also includes a series of indicator variables for
metropolitan status, Hispanic ethnicity and race. White is the reference category for race variables. Douglas
and Steinberger (2015) find that gay Black men make significantly less than gay White men. This leads me
to expect that the coe cient for the “Black=1” variable will be negative. Douglas and Steinberger (2015)
also explored wage di↵erentials between gay and lesbian Asian people and their White counterpart. They
find that there is a positive, but statistically insignificant di↵erence between the wages of gay and lesbian
Asian people and gay and lesbian White people. Thus, I expect that the “Asian=1” variable will be positive
and/or statistically indistinguishable from zero at standard levels of significance. The “American Indian=1”
and “Other Race=1” variables are di cult to predict. I measure education using indicator variables for
education attainment ranging from people who did not graduate from high school through doctoral degrees.
I omit bachelor’s degree as a control variable, making it the reference category. The variables take the value
of one if that is the person’s highest level of education and zero otherwise. I expect the indicator variables
for educational attainment below a bachelor’s degree to have negative coe cients and those above to have
positive coe cients. I estimate some models that include indicator variables controlling for occupation in
Xist. Occupations are codified according to the two-digit SOC listing. The two-digit SOC listing allows
a certain class of occupation to be included under a single indicator variable. This is beneficial because it
allows for a detailed codification of occupations without limiting the degrees of freedom too severely.
3I also estimate regressions (not shown) that included an indicator variable equal to one if the individual had an own child
under the age of five living in the house in an attempt to capture the time intensity of young children. However, there were
very few gay or lesbian people with children under five and the variable was statistically and economically insignificant.
4Pregnancies form past, heterosexual relationships are not uncommon, so it is incorrect to suggest that same sex couples
cannot have children from accidental pregnancies.
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Next, vs is a set of indicator variables that equals one if the individual lives in state s. These variables will
capture state level fixed e↵ects. zst is a vector of indicator variables for whether the person lives in a state
s that had implemented an Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) that protected gay and lesbian
people in year t and for whether same-sex marriage was legalized in state s at time t. These variables are
added to capture any potential e↵ects of the legal environment with respect to same-sex marriage. However,
because of the methodology of the ACS, it is di cult to identify exactly which observations are a↵ected by a
given legal framework. As mentioned in the Data section above, the ACS collects responses throughout the
calendar year and asks respondents about the 12 months prior to their date of observation (Hansen et al.,
2019). Because the ACS does not include a variable indicating the survey month, nor does it ask respondents
to give any month-level data, there is little recourse for accurately determining which observations taken
in the year that the ENDA or legal same-sex marriage are passed are living in a state with an ENDA or
legalized same-sex marriage and which are not. Therefore, I determine that someone is living in a state
with an ENDA if the year of observation minus one is greater than the year that the ENDA was enacted. I
follow the same process for same-sex marriage legalization. This means that people living in states directly
a↵ected by Obergefell will be considered to be living in a state where same-sex marriage is legal beginning in
observation year 2016. Observations taken in 2015, the year that the Obergefell decision was handed down,
will be considered to be living in a state where same-sex marriage is not legal. I expect that legal access to
marriage and employment non-discrimination laws will have positive coe cients.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Gay Men - Baseline
The results for the baseline regression on the full-sample of gay men are presented in Table 4.2. Columns
(1) and (2) use ln(Wage) as the dependent variable while Columns (3) and (4) use ln(Earnings). Columns
(2) and (4) include occupation variables as controls. The baseline results suggest that gay men experience
a marriage premium that is both statistically and economically significant. The positive coe cient for
the “Married=1” variable appears regardless of whether ln(Wage) or ln(Earnings) is used as the control
variable and is robust to the inclusion of occupation variables as well. In the ln(Wage) model that controls
for occupation, my estimates suggest that married gay men have wages that are 3.9% or $1.30 higher than
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cohabiting gay men.5 In the model that uses ln(Earnings) as the dependent variable and includes occupation
variables, the marriage coe cient equates to a 4.4% or $3,346.10 increase in earnings.
There is a body of evidence that suggests that these regression results are credible. The adjusted R2 is
similar to other labor economics research. Secondly, the F-statistic (Not shown) is significant at p = .0001.
Lastly, the direction, magnitudes and significance of the control variables are in line with economic theory
and past empirical results. As expected, the age variable has a positive coe cient of .0798 that is both
statistically and economically significant. Though not shown in the table, the age squared variable has a
negative coe cient, which was also expected. The variable for the number of own children living in the
household has a significant positive coe cient. Though it is unclear in which direction the causation runs,
this result was expected. As expected, there was a large and statistically significant wage gap between White
gay men and observably similar Black gay men. The magnitude of the result is similar to that found by
Douglas and Steinberger (2015). The result for the “Hispanic=1” indicator variable is also in line with my
expectations of a negative coe cient, though the magnitude of my estimation is higher than that of Douglas
and Steinberger (2015). The direction of the “American Indian=1” and “Other Race=1” variables was
theoretically ambiguous, but my results estimate a negative coe cient for both. The results for the “State
has an ENDA=1,” “Same-sex marriage legal=1,” and “Asian=1” were the unexpected results of the baseline
regression. I attempted to find an explanation for the legal results by estimating the baseline regression on
the full-sample of gay men with the inclusion of a time trend variable and its square. The results are shown
in Table 9. The “Time Trend” variable equals 1 if the observation year is 2012, equal 2 if the observation
year is 2013 and so on, following the same pattern until “Time Trend” is equal to 6 if the observation year is
2017. However, the inclusion of these variables did not have a significant e↵ect on the direction or magnitude
of the legal framework variables.
4.3.2 Gay Men - Robustness Tests
Next, I conduct a series of robustness tests. The coe cients for the “Married=1” variable of each robustness
test is presented in Table 4.3. More complete results for these regressions can be found in the Appendix.
Plu¨mper and Neumayer (2015) write that robustness tests are used to “analyze the dependence or inde-
pendence of estimated results on model specification assumptions.” The likelihood that the magnitude and
direction of the initial results are valid is larger if changes to the empirical specification result in only minor
5I calculate the marginal returns to marriage using the formula e    1. This same formula is used throughout the results
section. To calculate the marginal e↵ect in dollar terms, I multiply the percentage e↵ect by the unconditional averages for
unmarried gay or lesbian people, which can be found in the descriptive statistics table.
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Table 4.2: OLS Regression Results - Full-Sample of Gay Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0435⇤⇤⇤ 0.0387⇤⇤⇤ 0.0486⇤⇤⇤ 0.0430⇤⇤⇤
(0.00962) (0.00910) (0.00989) (0.00929)
Age 0.0798⇤⇤⇤ 0.0691⇤⇤⇤ 0.0845⇤⇤⇤ 0.0723⇤⇤⇤
(0.00353) (0.00336) (0.00359) (0.00341)
Number of own children in the household 0.0251⇤⇤⇤ 0.0325⇤⇤⇤ 0.0267⇤⇤⇤ 0.0345⇤⇤⇤
(0.00690) (0.00651) (0.00709) (0.00664)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.0906 -0.0658 -0.0978 -0.0680
(0.0924) (0.0822) (0.0956) (0.0858)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.00904 -0.0113 -0.00720 -0.00996
(0.0153) (0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0148)
Black=1 -0.214⇤⇤⇤ -0.152⇤⇤⇤ -0.242⇤⇤⇤ -0.176⇤⇤⇤
(0.0203) (0.0191) (0.0205) (0.0193)
Asian=1 -0.0431⇤ -0.0527⇤⇤ -0.0659⇤⇤ -0.0703⇤⇤⇤
(0.0214) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0205)
American Indian=1 -0.253⇤⇤ -0.231⇤⇤ -0.241⇤⇤ -0.213⇤⇤
(0.0786) (0.0793) (0.0752) (0.0756)
Other race=1 -0.0903⇤⇤⇤ -0.0642⇤⇤⇤ -0.0939⇤⇤⇤ -0.0657⇤⇤⇤
(0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0180)
Hispanic=1 -0.160⇤⇤⇤ -0.107⇤⇤⇤ -0.183⇤⇤⇤ -0.126⇤⇤⇤
(0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0139) (0.0131)
Observations 24460 24460 24460 24460
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.332 0.259 0.348
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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changes to the results (Plu¨mper and Neumayer, 2015).
I start by limiting the sample to observations from states where gay marriage was legal at the time of the
observation. This tests whether the results from the baseline regression are driven by the legal framework
of the state. However, as mentioned above, there are limitations to the ACS in this respect. Thus, I mark
a person as living in a state with legal gay marriage if the year of observation minus one is greater than
the year that marriage equality was legalized. The results observed in the baseline regression are robust to
limiting the sample in this way. The estimates increase in magnitude by between 6.7 and 10.1% (depending
on the model) and remain highly statistically significant.
I next perform two robustness tests that alter the age range of the sample. First, I extend the lower
bound of the age range from 25 to 18. The results remain robust to the extension of the lower bound.
The coe cient estimates have similar magnitudes to the baseline results and continue to be positive and
statistically significant at .001%. I then lower the upper bound of the age range from 64 to 54. These results
remain positive and statistically significant, but the magnitudes decrease by more than 11% in all models.
Next, I add all of the observations that are employed, though not necessarily working full-time, into the
sample and include an indicator variable that equals one if the worker is a full-time worker. The coe cient
estimates remain positive and significant, but the magnitude decreases by more than 21% in all models and
up to 41.6% in Column (4).
The next row reports the results for the estimation of the baseline regression plus a series of interaction
variables between marriage and levels of educational attainment on the full-sample of gay men. The marriage
coe cients remain significant and are larger than the results in Table 4.2. The more complete results,
presented in Table 5, also show that none of the interaction variables have a significant e↵ect in any of the
models, with the exception of the “Marriage * Associates Degree” interaction. I estimate that people who
are married and have an associates degree have wages that are more than 5.5% lower and earnings that are
more than 6.0% lower than their counterparts with bachelors degrees.
Given the significance of children demonstrated by Martell and Roncolato (2016) and Giddings et al.
(2014), I perform a series of robustness tests regarding children. First, I remove the variable for the “Number
of own children in the household.” The coe cient for the marriage variable is larger than the Table 4.2 results
for Column (1), but are identical for Columns (2) through (4). The results are still significant as well. Finally,
I partition the sample into gay men without and with children. The results for men without children are
similar in magnitude to the baseline results and remain statistically significant. Lastly, I estimate the same
regression for gay men with children. The magnitudes of the coe cients are more than 45% larger than
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the baseline results. The results are only significant at 5%, but there are only 2877 observations, far fewer
than all of the other regressions. Though they are less statistically significant, the results are still highly
economically significant.
These results suggest that the economically and statistically significant marriage premium found in the
baseline regression is not driven by the legal framework, the age range of the sample, the exclusion of part-
time workers, di↵erences in educational attainment or the number of children in the household. In total,
these results point to a credible set of results for the baseline regression. Thus, I continue by investigating
the mechanism of the marriage premium for gay men.
4.3.3 Gay Men - Mechanism
The results of the baseline regression and subsequent robustness tests say little about the mechanism by
which the observed marriage premium is achieved. Any of the major hypotheses about the marriage premium
for straight men can be slightly adapted to fit the pattern of results in the baseline regression. Thus, I test
for evidence of household specialization by splitting the sample into primary and secondary earners. As
discussed above, a disparity in the wage e↵ects of marriage for primary and secondary earners would point
to a specialization e↵ect.6 I divide the sample into primary and secondary earners because I suspect that
primary earning gay men may have a comparative advantage in wage earning over secondary earners. I
present results for the regressions on the primary and secondary earner sub-samples in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Table 4.4 uses ln(Wage) as the dependent variable for all four models and Table 4.5 uses ln(Earnings). In
both tables, the results for primary earners are presented in Columns (1) and (2) while Columns (3) and (4)
show the results for secondary earners. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation controls.
The pattern of results is the same regardless of the dependent variable or whether occupation variables
are included. For primary earners, there is a large and statistically significant wage return to marriage while
the “Married=1” coe cient for secondary earners is small and statistically and economically insignificant.
These estimates suggest that among primary earning gay men, married men have wages that are more than
7% higher than cohabiting men. This corresponds to a $3.11 premium in the Column (1) model and a $2.90
wage premium in the column (2) model. With regard to earnings, primary earning married gay men have
earnings that are 8.1% or 7.5% (depending on the model) higher than their cohabiting counterparts. These
correspond to an earnings premium that is more than $7,000 dollars for both models.
Moreover, the results seem credible. The R2 values remain at a reasonable level for labor economics
6This does not necessarily mean that both partners cannot have a marriage premium.
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression Results - Gay Men Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Observations from states and years where marriage was legal
Married=1 0.0479⇤⇤⇤ 0.0420⇤⇤⇤ 0.0527⇤⇤⇤ 0.0459⇤⇤⇤
(0.0112) (0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0109)
Observations 15700 15700 15700 15700
Men age 18-64
Married=1 0.0447⇤⇤⇤ 0.0398⇤⇤⇤ 0.0500⇤⇤⇤ 0.0442⇤⇤⇤
(0.00950) (0.00899) (0.00975) (0.00918)
Observations 25179 25179 25179 25179
Men age 25-54
Married=1 0.0350⇤⇤⇤ 0.0326⇤⇤ 0.0411⇤⇤⇤ 0.0381⇤⇤⇤
(0.0105) (0.00991) (0.0108) (0.0101)
Observations 19894 19894 19894 19894
All workers, with full-time control variable
Married=1 0.0340⇤⇤⇤ 0.0294⇤⇤ 0.0304⇤⇤ 0.0251⇤
(0.00942) (0.00898) (0.0102) (0.00977)
Observations 29151 29151 29151 29151
Marriage * educational attainment interaction variables
Married=1 0.0435⇤⇤⇤ 0.0387⇤⇤⇤ 0.0486⇤⇤⇤ 0.0430⇤⇤⇤
(0.00962) (0.00910) (0.00989) (0.00929)
Observations 24460 24460 24460 24460
Number of children variable removed
Married=1 0.0507⇤⇤⇤ 0.0387⇤⇤⇤ 0.0486⇤⇤⇤ 0.0430⇤⇤⇤
(0.00950) (0.00910) (0.00989) (0.00929)
Observations 24460 24460 24460 24460
Men without children
Married=1 0.0423⇤⇤⇤ 0.0375⇤⇤⇤ 0.0473⇤⇤⇤ 0.0415⇤⇤⇤
(0.0102) (0.00969) (0.0105) (0.00990)
Observations 21583 21583 21583 21583
Men with children
Married=1 0.0633⇤ 0.0624⇤ 0.0717⇤ 0.0722⇤
(0.0299) (0.0285) (0.0307) (0.0289)
Observations 2877 2877 2877 2877
Note: Unless otherwise noted, control variables are the same as the full-sample
regression.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 ACS.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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research and the F-statistic is highly significant in all eight models. The pattern of results for the race and
ethnicity variables matches the baseline results for both primary and secondary earners. However, there is
another disparity between the results for primary and secondary earners with regards to children. Primary
earners see a positive and statistically significant wage e↵ect of children, while secondary earners have a
small coe cient that is highly insignificant. These results are in line with specialization as the mechanism
for the marriage premium.
Table 4.4: OLS Regression Results - Primary and Secondary Earning Gay Men, ln(Wage) Models
Primary Earners Secondary Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage)
Married=1 0.0735⇤⇤⇤ 0.0686⇤⇤⇤ 0.00649 0.00154
(0.0117) (0.0111) (0.0145) (0.0139)
Age 0.0845⇤⇤⇤ 0.0744⇤⇤⇤ 0.0731⇤⇤⇤ 0.0648⇤⇤⇤
(0.00432) (0.00415) (0.00533) (0.00510)
Number of own children in the household 0.0195⇤ 0.0288⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000515 0.00549
(0.00780) (0.00731) (0.0123) (0.0120)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.0428 0.00721 -0.0297 -0.00836
(0.113) (0.0956) (0.133) (0.125)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0203 -0.0242 -0.0395 -0.0417
(0.0186) (0.0175) (0.0227) (0.0218)
Black=1 -0.209⇤⇤⇤ -0.141⇤⇤⇤ -0.179⇤⇤⇤ -0.141⇤⇤⇤
(0.0265) (0.0249) (0.0288) (0.0272)
Asian=1 -0.0312 -0.0496⇤ -0.0570 -0.0495
(0.0257) (0.0239) (0.0324) (0.0310)
American Indian=1 -0.141⇤ -0.0913 -0.358⇤⇤ -0.367⇤⇤
(0.0716) (0.0683) (0.133) (0.136)
Other race=1 -0.105⇤⇤⇤ -0.0739⇤⇤ -0.0562⇤ -0.0418
(0.0249) (0.0237) (0.0264) (0.0254)
Hispanic=1 -0.171⇤⇤⇤ -0.129⇤⇤⇤ -0.102⇤⇤⇤ -0.0559⇤⇤
(0.0173) (0.0164) (0.0196) (0.0189)
Observations 14677 14677 9294 9294
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.360 0.193 0.262
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression Results - Primary and Secondary Earning Gay Men, ln(Earnings) Models
Primary Earners Secondary Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0781⇤⇤⇤ 0.0725⇤⇤⇤ 0.0109 0.00483
(0.0122) (0.0114) (0.0147) (0.0140)
Age 0.0915⇤⇤⇤ 0.0795⇤⇤⇤ 0.0744⇤⇤⇤ 0.0650⇤⇤⇤
(0.00445) (0.00426) (0.00537) (0.00511)
Number of own children in the household 0.0226⇤⇤ 0.0321⇤⇤⇤ -0.000928 0.00568
(0.00809) (0.00754) (0.0123) (0.0119)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.0392 0.0230 -0.0379 -0.0196
(0.116) (0.100) (0.134) (0.126)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0170 -0.0219 -0.0404 -0.0419
(0.0194) (0.0182) (0.0232) (0.0221)
Black=1 -0.245⇤⇤⇤ -0.171⇤⇤⇤ -0.193⇤⇤⇤ -0.155⇤⇤⇤
(0.0270) (0.0253) (0.0290) (0.0274)
Asian=1 -0.0598⇤ -0.0723⇤⇤ -0.0692⇤ -0.0570
(0.0270) (0.0252) (0.0327) (0.0314)
American Indian=1 -0.158⇤ -0.107 -0.310⇤ -0.309⇤
(0.0697) (0.0658) (0.127) (0.130)
Other race=1 -0.109⇤⇤⇤ -0.0755⇤⇤ -0.0553⇤ -0.0398
(0.0252) (0.0240) (0.0266) (0.0254)
Hispanic=1 -0.190⇤⇤⇤ -0.144⇤⇤⇤ -0.132⇤⇤⇤ -0.0813⇤⇤⇤
(0.0180) (0.0170) (0.0198) (0.0191)
Observations 14677 14677 9294 9294
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.374 0.205 0.280
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Though the results for primary and secondary earners are in-line with theories of increased household
specialization, they do not provide direct evidence that marriage increases specialization. Following the work
of Giddings et al. (2014), I estimate a regression that will directly test the e↵ect of marriage on two measures
of household specialization. The results for these regressions are reported in Table 4.6. Columns (1) and (2)
use the natural log of the absolute value of the di↵erence in the partners’ wages as the dependent variable,
while Columns (3) and (4) use the absolute value of the di↵erence in the hours worked by each partner in
the last year.7 Columns (2) and (4) control for occupation variables.
The results show that marriage has a large and statistically significant e↵ect on the specialization of gay
households. The di↵erence in the wages of married partners is 10.8% greater than the same measure for
cohabiting gay couples. Married gay couples also have di↵erent patterns of time spent in the labor market
than their cohabiting counterparts. The di↵erence in the number of hours worked in the past year by married
couples is more than 40 hours higher than cohabiting gay couples. Interestingly, the number of own children
in the household creates modest increases to the couple’s wage di↵erence, but increases the di↵erence in
annual work hours by more than 78 hours in both models. The diagnostic statistics are less convincing.
While the F-statistic remains highly significant, the adjusted R2 is lower than would be expected in all
four models. These results provide cursory evidence of a higher degree of specialization among married gay
couples, but are not conclusive.8
I also tested for employer favoritism as a potential mechanism. Following the methodology of Loh (1996),
I estimate the same four models on the sub-sample of primary-earning, self-employed gay men because,
theoretically, self employed workers will not benefit from employer favoritism. The literature provides mixed
evidence on the qualitative di↵erences in the wage determination of those who are self-employed and those
who are not (Loh, 1996). While these would pose much larger di culties for a comparison of self-employed
and firm-employed workers, the within group analysis of married and unmarried gay self-employed workers
mitigates some of the issues with the analysis (Loh, 1996). The results for this regression are presented in
Table 4.7. There were a total of just 791 observations in the sample. The marriage coe cients are large and
positive, though they are statistically insignificant. The age and age squared variables are in the expected
direction and of the expected magnitude, but they are only significant when occupation is not controlled for.
Conversely, the number of children in the household has a positive e↵ect on the wages and earnings, but
7It should be noted that the variable for the number of weeks worked in the previous 12 months is banded, so I again use
the mid-point of these bands to calculate the number of hours worked in a year.
8I found a similar pattern of results when I did not take the natural log and instead used the absolute value of the di↵erence
in wages, which would include couples that had no di↵erence in their wages.
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Table 4.6: OLS Regression Results - E↵ects of Marriage on Specialization for Gay Men
Wage di↵erence Hour di↵erence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Married=1 0.103⇤⇤⇤ 0.101⇤⇤⇤ 47.42⇤⇤⇤ 44.75⇤⇤⇤
(0.0187) (0.0185) (12.04) (12.03)
Age 0.0958⇤⇤⇤ 0.0875⇤⇤⇤ -33.15⇤⇤⇤ -34.69⇤⇤⇤
(0.00722) (0.00721) (4.533) (4.540)
Number of own children in the household 0.0410⇤⇤ 0.0454⇤⇤⇤ 81.57⇤⇤⇤ 78.05⇤⇤⇤
(0.0139) (0.0137) (9.483) (9.460)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.304 -0.264 -146.3 -149.7
(0.191) (0.186) (127.6) (126.4)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0575 -0.0597⇤ 21.04 21.18
(0.0305) (0.0302) (19.04) (18.99)
Black=1 -0.161⇤⇤⇤ -0.113⇤⇤ -13.87 -16.26
(0.0415) (0.0413) (26.65) (26.61)
Asian=1 0.110⇤⇤ 0.0957⇤ 32.82 27.01
(0.0385) (0.0382) (26.33) (26.32)
American Indian=1 -0.133 -0.0999 -47.05 -40.22
(0.166) (0.165) (64.26) (64.08)
Other race=1 -0.0325 -0.0129 44.59 44.85
(0.0420) (0.0421) (25.04) (25.07)
Hispanic=1 -0.152⇤⇤⇤ -0.112⇤⇤⇤ -54.30⇤⇤ -52.98⇤⇤
(0.0290) (0.0288) (17.17) (17.24)
Observations 23971 23971 24460 24460
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.128 0.040 0.045
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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the coe cient is statistically significant only when occupation variables are included. The coe cients for
the “Black=1” variable are very large and negative, but not significant at traditional levels. The indicator
variable for Hispanic ethnicity is large and negative and is significant at p=5%. The R2 value is lower than
typical. As a whole, these results only provide inconclusive evidence of a marriage premium for primary
earning, self-employed gay men.
Table 4.7: OLS Regression Results - Self-Employed, Primary Earning Gay Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0709 0.107 0.0443 0.0784
(0.0876) (0.0870) (0.0890) (0.0871)
Age 0.0768⇤ 0.0758 0.0808⇤ 0.0763
(0.0391) (0.0400) (0.0390) (0.0402)
Number of own children in the household 0.0665 0.0817⇤ 0.0666 0.0840⇤
(0.0405) (0.0371) (0.0433) (0.0389)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.287 -0.0364 0.144 0.435
(0.233) (0.349) (0.211) (0.335)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0326 0.00404 -0.00473 0.0313
(0.138) (0.131) (0.138) (0.130)
Black=1 -0.415 -0.272 -0.379 -0.230
(0.250) (0.232) (0.236) (0.224)
Asian=1 -0.0775 -0.119 -0.129 -0.185
(0.161) (0.161) (0.171) (0.170)
American Indian=1 0.637⇤ 0.992⇤⇤ 0.385 0.754⇤
(0.255) (0.349) (0.324) (0.329)
Other race=1 -0.0378 -0.0116 -0.0722 -0.0386
(0.185) (0.182) (0.198) (0.191)
Hispanic=1 -0.292⇤ -0.260⇤ -0.277⇤ -0.245⇤
(0.129) (0.123) (0.133) (0.125)
Observations 791 791 791 791
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.214 0.145 0.230
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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4.3.4 Lesbian Women - Baseline
The regression results for the baseline model on the full-sample of lesbian women are presented in Table
4.8. Columns (1) and (2) have ln(Wage) as their dependent variable and columns (3) and (4) use the
ln(Earnings) variable. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation variables as controls. Like the results for gay
men, I find that marriage has a large and positive impact on the wages of coupled lesbian women that is
highly statistically significant. I estimate that the wage e↵ect of marriage is 7.0% or $1.77 in Column (1)
and 5.9% or $1.49 in the Column (2) model. Married lesbian women have earnings that are 7.1% or 5.9%
higher than the earnings of unmarried lesbian women. Those values correspond to an earnings di↵erence of
$4057.96 and $3372 depending on the model. The results are similar for all four models, suggesting that
they are robust to variations of the dependent variable and the inclusion of occupation indicator variables
as controls.
The diagnostic statistics and the results for control variables suggest that this is a credible set of results.
As expected, the results show a positive wage and earnings returns to age, while the “Age Squared” variable
(not shown) has a negative coe cient. I observe an interesting pattern of results for the “Number of own
children in the household” variable. The wage increase from children is smaller than that for gay men and
less statistically significant. While I suspect that the results for gay men are driven by men with higher
incomes having more children, the results for lesbian women can likely be explained by the lower cost of
having children for lesbian women relative to gay men. I also observe a peculiar pattern of results for the
explanatory variables that capture the legal context. The coe cients for “State has an ENDA=1” are large,
positive and economically significant, but are not statistically significant at traditional levels. However, the
coe cients for “Same-sex marriage legal=1” are sizable and negative. The results are statistically significant
at 5% in Column (3), the model with ln(Earnings) as the dependent variable and without the occupation
indicator variables. The race and ethnicity variables match my expectations. There is a large wage gap
between White and Black lesbian women that is economically and statistically significant. I find a similar,
though smaller, gap between White and Hispanic lesbian women. These results mirror the wage gap between
White and Black lesbians and White and Hispanic lesbians found by Douglas and Steinberger (2015). As
expected, the “Asian=1” variable has small and statistically insignificant coe cients.
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Table 4.8: OLS Regression Results - Full-Sample of Lesbian Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0677⇤⇤⇤ 0.0577⇤⇤⇤ 0.0684⇤⇤⇤ 0.0577⇤⇤⇤
(0.00831) (0.00785) (0.00850) (0.00800)
Age 0.0756⇤⇤⇤ 0.0674⇤⇤⇤ 0.0818⇤⇤⇤ 0.0724⇤⇤⇤
(0.00307) (0.00293) (0.00312) (0.00297)
Number of own children in the household 0.0107⇤ 0.0134⇤⇤⇤ 0.00783 0.0104⇤
(0.00426) (0.00403) (0.00442) (0.00415)
State has an ENDA=1 0.121 0.125 0.101 0.111
(0.0969) (0.0966) (0.0991) (0.0981)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0231 -0.0195 -0.0274⇤ -0.0240
(0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0138) (0.0130)
Black=1 -0.179⇤⇤⇤ -0.129⇤⇤⇤ -0.194⇤⇤⇤ -0.139⇤⇤⇤
(0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0146)
Asian=1 0.0145 -0.00230 0.0147 0.00361
(0.0252) (0.0233) (0.0252) (0.0233)
American Indian=1 -0.0466 -0.0124 -0.0301 0.00405
(0.0465) (0.0428) (0.0479) (0.0443)
Other race=1 -0.0147 -0.0127 -0.0110 -0.00734
(0.0177) (0.0165) (0.0182) (0.0170)
Hispanic=1 -0.106⇤⇤⇤ -0.0830⇤⇤⇤ -0.117⇤⇤⇤ -0.0922⇤⇤⇤
(0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0126)
Observations 23794 23794 23794 23794
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.365 0.295 0.382
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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4.3.5 Lesbian Women - Robustness Checks
I next estimate the same battery of robustness checks that I did for gay men. The coe cients for the “Mar-
ried=1” variable are presented in Table 4.9. Along with the standard errors and the number of observations
for each regression. Like the baseline results, Columns (1) and (2) have ln(Wage) as the dependent variable
and Columns (3) and (4) use ln(Earnings). Columns (2) and (4) include occupational controls. More com-
plete regression results for each robustness check can be found in the Appendix Tables 12 through 18. These
results suggest that the baseline results are robust to di↵erences in the legal landscape, the age range, the
inclusion of all workers, the inclusion of education interactions and the presence of children in the household.
I begin by testing the e↵ects of the legal landscape on the results. The coe cients of the “Married=1”
remain positive and highly significant when I limit the sample to lesbian women that are living in a state
where same-sex marriage was legal.9 The coe cients also increase in magnitude by more than 18% in the
ln(Wage) models and more than 13% in the ln(Earnings) models relative to the baseline coe cients.
Next, I estimate two robustness checks by regressing the same regression on di↵erent partitions of the
sample by age. First, I extend the lower limit from 25 to 18. The results are similar in magnitude to the
baseline results (no more than 3.0% less than the baseline coe cients) and remain positive and statistically
significant. I then return the lower limit of the age range to 25 and reduce the upper limit from 64 to 54.
This reduces the magnitude of the coe cients for the “Married=1” variable, but the results are significant,
though at 1% instead of .1% for the Column (2) model.
I then estimate a regression on the sample of all employed people, not just full-time workers, and include
an indicator variable that equals one if the person is a full-time worker. The coe cients remain positive,
highly significant and of magnitude similar to the baseline results. In the ln(Wage) models, the coe cients
are less than 3.1% smaller than baseline coe cients.
Next, I estimate the baseline regression on the full-sample of lesbian women, but include a series of
interaction variables between the “Married=1” variable and the various educational attainment indicators.
A more complete table of results can be seen in Table 15. Not only is the “Married=1” variable positive and
significant, it’s coe cients are no more than 18% less than the baseline coe cients. Moreover, none of the
results for the interaction terms are significant.
The final three robustness checks evaluate the significance of children to the baseline results. Excluding
the “Number of own children in the household” variable produces highly significant positive coe cients that
9As mentioned above, someone is said to live in a state with legal same-sex marriage if the observation year minus one is
greater than the year that same-sex marriage was legalized.
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are similar in magnitude to the baseline models. I next partition the sample into lesbian women with and
without children and estimate the same regression. The results for lesbian women without children have a
smaller magnitude, but are still positive and significant at .1%. The sample of women with children produces
the largest marriage coe cients. Despite the smaller sample size, the results are significant and still indicate
a positive wage return to marriage.
4.3.6 Lesbian Women - Mechanism
To test the specialization explanation, I divide the sample of lesbian women into primary and secondary
earning sub-samples using the same definition as above. As mentioned in the Gay Men - Mechanism section,
I make this division in the sample because I the specialization explanation suggests that there should be a
divergence in the wage e↵ects of marriage between partners. The results of these regressions are displayed
in Tables 4.10 and 4.11. Table 4.10 uses ln(Wage) as the dependent variable for all four models and Table
4.11 uses ln(Earnings). In both tables, the results for primary earners are presented in Columns (1) and (2)
while Columns (3) and (4) show the results for secondary earners. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation
controls.
The results suggest that there is also a primary/secondary earner e↵ect for lesbian women. The “Mar-
ried=1” coe cients for primary earners are large and significant at .1% while the coe cients for secondary
earners are much smaller and less significant. These coe cients correspond with an wage premium of 8.9%
or 7.8% for primary earners. In dollar terms, these correspond to $2.76 $2.33 respectively. I also find an
earnings premium of 9.3% or 7.8% for married primary earning lesbian women. In dollar terms, these corre-
spond to $6478.27 and $5444.24 respectively. The e↵ects of marriage for secondary earners are less than 3%
for all four models. Column (3) in Table 10 is the only secondary earner regression where the “Married=1”
variable is significant at traditional levels. The coe cients for the age, race and ethnicity variables follow the
same pattern as the baseline results and match expectations. When the sample is partitioned by primary and
secondary earners, the e↵ect of children becomes small and statistically insignificant for both groups. The
coe cient for “Same-sex marriage legal=1” is sizable, negative and significant at 5% for secondary earning
lesbian women. Finally, there is an interesting pattern of results for the “State has an ENDA=1” variable.
Though the coe cients are statistically insignificant at 5%, the results show a much larger wage e↵ect of an
ENDA that protects gay and lesbian people for secondary earning lesbian women than their primary earning
counterparts. This pattern of results is economically significant and diverges from the results for gay men.
In total, this pattern of results is consistent with the specialization explanation.
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Table 4.9: OLS Regression Results - Lesbian Women Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Observations from states and years where marriage was legal
Married=1 0.0805⇤⇤⇤ 0.0707⇤⇤⇤ 0.0775⇤⇤⇤ 0.0673⇤⇤⇤
(0.00985) (0.00930) (0.0101) (0.00949)
Observations 15157 15157 15157 15157
Women age 18-64
Married=1 0.0657⇤⇤⇤ 0.0554⇤⇤⇤ 0.0674⇤⇤⇤ 0.0560⇤⇤⇤
(0.00811) (0.00767) (0.00830) (0.00782)
Observations 24910 24910 24910 24910
Women age 25-54
Married=1 0.0350⇤⇤⇤ 0.0326⇤⇤ 0.0411⇤⇤⇤ 0.0381⇤⇤⇤
(0.0105) (0.00991) (0.0108) (0.0101)
Observations 19894 19894 19894 19894
All workers, with full-time control variable
Married=1 0.0674⇤⇤⇤ 0.0559⇤⇤⇤ 0.0537⇤⇤⇤ 0.0418⇤⇤⇤
(0.00814) (0.00776) (0.00922) (0.00884)
Observations 29458 29458 29458 29458
Marriage * educational attainment interaction variables
Married=1 0.0643⇤⇤⇤ 0.0473⇤⇤⇤ 0.0659⇤⇤⇤ 0.0484⇤⇤⇤
(0.0140) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0134)
Observations 23794 23794 23794 23794
Number of children variable removed
Married=1 0.0700⇤⇤⇤ 0.0577⇤⇤⇤ 0.0684⇤⇤⇤ 0.0577⇤⇤⇤
(0.00827) (0.00785) (0.00850) (0.00800)
Observations 23794 23794 23794 23794
Women without children
Married=1 0.0497⇤⇤⇤ 0.0457⇤⇤⇤ 0.0460⇤⇤⇤ 0.0419⇤⇤⇤
(0.00994) (0.00937) (0.0102) (0.00955)
Observations 16541 16541 16541 16541
Women with children
Married=1 0.106⇤⇤⇤ 0.0842⇤⇤⇤ 0.117⇤⇤⇤ 0.0929⇤⇤⇤
(0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0157) (0.0148)
Observations 7253 7253 7253 7253
Note: Unless otherwise noted, control variables are the same as the full-sample
regression.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 ACS.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 4.10: OLS Regression Results - Primary and Secondary Earning Lesbian Women, ln(Wage) Models
Primary Earners Secondary Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage)
Married=1 0.0860⇤⇤⇤ 0.0733⇤⇤⇤ 0.0276⇤ 0.0217
(0.00996) (0.00934) (0.0134) (0.0129)
Age 0.0818⇤⇤⇤ 0.0726⇤⇤⇤ 0.0726⇤⇤⇤ 0.0674⇤⇤⇤
(0.00366) (0.00347) (0.00509) (0.00492)
Number of own children in the household 0.00524 0.00839 0.00233 0.00449
(0.00510) (0.00481) (0.00696) (0.00669)
State has an ENDA=1 0.0804 0.0702 0.279 0.282
(0.131) (0.133) (0.151) (0.155)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0125 -0.00184 -0.0421⇤ -0.0474⇤
(0.0163) (0.0152) (0.0214) (0.0205)
Black=1 -0.214⇤⇤⇤ -0.155⇤⇤⇤ -0.158⇤⇤⇤ -0.121⇤⇤⇤
(0.0186) (0.0172) (0.0250) (0.0243)
Asian=1 0.0433 0.0278 -0.0372 -0.0450
(0.0306) (0.0277) (0.0378) (0.0362)
American Indian=1 -0.0510 -0.0258 -0.0590 -0.0187
(0.0591) (0.0553) (0.0690) (0.0635)
Other race=1 -0.0205 -0.0168 -0.0177 -0.0125
(0.0215) (0.0202) (0.0281) (0.0264)
Hispanic=1 -0.122⇤⇤⇤ -0.100⇤⇤⇤ -0.0752⇤⇤⇤ -0.0582⇤⇤
(0.0161) (0.0151) (0.0208) (0.0201)
Observations 14891 14891 8903 8903
Adjusted R2 0.317 0.405 0.229 0.294
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 4.11: OLS Regression Results - Primary and Secondary Earning Lesbian Women, ln(Earnings) Models
Primary Earners Secondary Earners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0891⇤⇤⇤ 0.0754⇤⇤⇤ 0.0240 0.0176
(0.0102) (0.00955) (0.0134) (0.0129)
Age 0.0893⇤⇤⇤ 0.0787⇤⇤⇤ 0.0774⇤⇤⇤ 0.0714⇤⇤⇤
(0.00375) (0.00354) (0.00504) (0.00486)
Number of own children in the household 0.00434 0.00717 -0.00605 -0.00389
(0.00531) (0.00497) (0.00700) (0.00670)
State has an ENDA=1 0.0577 0.0569 0.276 0.277
(0.133) (0.134) (0.152) (0.155)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0178 -0.00679 -0.0446⇤ -0.0505⇤
(0.0167) (0.0156) (0.0214) (0.0205)
Black=1 -0.233⇤⇤⇤ -0.169⇤⇤⇤ -0.167⇤⇤⇤ -0.127⇤⇤⇤
(0.0186) (0.0171) (0.0248) (0.0242)
Asian=1 0.0315 0.0231 -0.0166 -0.0196
(0.0305) (0.0277) (0.0378) (0.0362)
American Indian=1 -0.0368 -0.0115 -0.0420 -0.00225
(0.0611) (0.0572) (0.0695) (0.0647)
Other race=1 -0.0185 -0.0125 -0.0125 -0.00610
(0.0225) (0.0210) (0.0278) (0.0260)
Hispanic=1 -0.138⇤⇤⇤ -0.114⇤⇤⇤ -0.0790⇤⇤⇤ -0.0608⇤⇤
(0.0165) (0.0154) (0.0207) (0.0199)
Observations 14891 14891 8903 8903
Adjusted R2 0.328 0.420 0.250 0.316
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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While the results for the primary and secondary earner point towards specialization driving the marriage
premium, it does not provide any direct evidence that married lesbian couples specialize more than their
cohabiting counterparts. Just as with the gay men, I estimate a series of regressions using two di↵erent
measures of household specialization as the dependent variable. The results of the regressions are presented
in Table 4.12. Columns (1) and (2) use the natural log of the absolute value of the di↵erence in wages and
Columns (3) and (4) use the positive di↵erence in the number of hours worked between the two partners.
Columns (2) and (4) include occupation variables as controls. I find that marriage has a statistically and
economically significant e↵ect on the di↵erence in wages that is robust to the inclusion of occupation variables.
On average, marriage increases the wage di↵erence by 16.5% or 15.6% depending on the model.10 I also
find that married lesbian couples have a significantly larger di↵erence in the number of hours worked than
cohabiting lesbian couples. In both models, I find that married lesbian couples have a di↵erence in annual
hours worked that is nearly 75 hours greater than cohabiting lesbian couples.
Finally, I report the regression results for the sample of primary earning, self-employed lesbian women
to test the employer favoritism explanation following the work of (Loh, 1996). If marriage makes people
more productive, or if more productive people get married, then we would expect that married self-employed
workers would have from the similar productivity di↵erences. As noted above, there are some di↵erences
in the wage determination of self-employed workers that create di culties. Moreover, there are only 494
observations in my sample, which creates more di culty in interpreting the results.
I find that the e↵ects of marriage are not universally positive and are not statistically significant in any
of the four models. The coe cient in column one is small and negative, while the coe cients in columns
(2) through (4) are small and positive. The results are not economically significant in any of the models.
I do find positive and significant results for the age coe cients and for the number of own children in the
household. The “Black=1” variable is significant at 5% in all four models, but it is much larger than would
be expected. This is likely due to the fact that there are fewer than 50 self-employed black lesbian women
in the sample. The results of the “Other race=1” variable are contrary to expectations, but this is, again,
likely driven by the fact that there are fewer than 30 such observations. The e↵ect of a Hispanic ethnicity
are positive, which is contrary to the results of the baseline regressions. In total, it is di cult to glean any
meaningful implications from these results. They do not point definitively in the direction of any mechanism.
10I found a similar pattern of results when I did not take the natural log and instead used the absolute value of the di↵erence
in wages, which would include couples that had no di↵erence in their wages.
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Table 4.12: OLS Regression Results - Lesbian Women Specialization
Wage di↵erence Hour di↵erence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Married=1 0.153⇤⇤⇤ 0.145⇤⇤⇤ 74.75⇤⇤⇤ 74.97⇤⇤⇤
(0.0186) (0.0185) (11.87) (11.83)
Age 0.0734⇤⇤⇤ 0.0672⇤⇤⇤ -30.98⇤⇤⇤ -32.30⇤⇤⇤
(0.00715) (0.00713) (4.529) (4.542)
Number of own children in the household 0.0462⇤⇤⇤ 0.0480⇤⇤⇤ 58.63⇤⇤⇤ 58.05⇤⇤⇤
(0.00958) (0.00946) (6.518) (6.488)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.0511 -0.0260 -266.9⇤ -248.7
(0.172) (0.172) (133.0) (131.8)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 0.00169 0.00529 -4.740 -4.882
(0.0314) (0.0311) (19.90) (19.83)
Black=1 -0.123⇤⇤⇤ -0.0873⇤⇤ 77.06⇤⇤ 78.97⇤⇤⇤
(0.0331) (0.0332) (23.54) (23.61)
Asian=1 0.100⇤ 0.0660 -9.185 -16.85
(0.0506) (0.0501) (32.87) (32.92)
American Indian=1 0.0540 0.0776 135.8⇤ 131.9⇤
(0.133) (0.133) (65.72) (66.34)
Other race=1 0.00541 0.00303 50.30⇤ 49.55
(0.0416) (0.0413) (25.58) (25.48)
Hispanic=1 -0.128⇤⇤⇤ -0.107⇤⇤⇤ 6.034 8.311
(0.0303) (0.0301) (18.65) (18.57)
Observations 23139 23139 23794 23794
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.117 0.034 0.041
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 4.13: OLS Regression Results - Self-Employed, Primary Earning Lesbian Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 -0.0163 0.0144 0.0193 0.0454
(0.103) (0.105) (0.104) (0.106)
Age 0.0871⇤ 0.0796 0.0909⇤ 0.0832⇤
(0.0409) (0.0413) (0.0415) (0.0412)
Number of own children in the household 0.102⇤ 0.0853 0.0964⇤ 0.0760
(0.0481) (0.0479) (0.0483) (0.0488)
State has an ENDA=1 0.256 0.220 0.410 0.391
(0.401) (0.342) (0.517) (0.474)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0276 -0.0827 -0.0184 -0.0676
(0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173)
Black=1 -0.510⇤ -0.441⇤ -0.500⇤ -0.415⇤
(0.203) (0.200) (0.197) (0.202)
Asian=1 -0.304 -0.305 -0.167 -0.178
(0.267) (0.291) (0.265) (0.295)
American Indian=1 0.0982 0.0378 0.220 0.142
(0.561) (0.592) (0.590) (0.619)
Other race=1 0.550⇤ 0.635⇤ 0.601⇤ 0.703⇤⇤
(0.275) (0.247) (0.288) (0.251)
Hispanic=1 0.171 0.155 0.113 0.105
(0.176) (0.171) (0.186) (0.181)
Observations 494 494 494 494
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.158 0.100 0.163
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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4.4 Discussion
In the baseline regressions I find that there is a sizable marriage premium for gay and lesbian people that
ranges between 3.9% and 5.0% for gay men and between 5.9% and 7.1% for lesbian women. This premium
appears to be robust to the use of either of the two dependent variables, the inclusion of occupation variables,
restricting the sample geographically, lowering the lower and upper bounds of the age range, including all
employed people, including education interactions as control variables and partitioning the sample on the
basis of children in the household.
Empirically, this pattern of results does not align with the selection hypothesis because there is a disparity
in the e↵ect of marriage for each partner. Based on evidence of a greater degree of positive assortative mating
in gay and lesbian couples from Jepsen and Jepsen (2002), we would expect to see similar e↵ects of marriage
for each partner if the premium was driven by selection. Moreover, I was able to provide evidence that runs
contrary to the vulnerability theory for lesbian women. This theory would have suggested that marriage
would decrease the wages of lesbian women because it decreased their vulnerability, but my results show a
marriage premium for lesbian women. I was unable to produce conclusive results on the employer favoritism
explanation. The evidence from the regression on the sample of self-employed workers failed to rule out the
possibility of employer favoritism for primary earning gay and lesbian people who are married. This suggests
that the body of evidence presented here is not dispositive of the employer favoritism explanation.
When I partition the sample into primary and secondary earning partners I find that marriage premium
remains for primary earning gay men, but the results for the secondary earner become statistically and
economically insignificant. On overage, a married primary earner makes between 7.1% and 8.1% more than
his unmarried counterpart. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that there is a sizable e↵ect of children on
the wage and earnings of primary earning gay men that is positive and statistically significant, while children
have a null e↵ect on the secondary earner. Caring for children is a time-intensive task, but the pattern of
results might suggest that the presence of a child induces the primary earner to allocate more time towards
wage earning, thereby increasing his wage or earnings, while the secondary earner focuses more on care labor.
The specialization explanation is also supported by cursory evidence that married gay men specialize more
than cohabiting gay men according to two measures. I find that married couples have a greater di↵erence
in their wages and a greater di↵erence in the number of hours worked annually than unmarried same-sex
couples. This suggests that marriage might be allowing or inducing gay and lesbian couples to specialize more
than their unmarried counterparts. Though I cannot directly connect the greater degree of specialization
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among married couples to the marriage premium, the fact that married couples are specializing more and the
empirical results for primary and secondary earners are in line with the specialization explanation provides
strong evidence that the marriage premium is being driven by household specialization.
There is a similar pattern of results for lesbian women. Primary earners have a much larger and highly
significant marriage premium while the secondary earners have smaller coe cients that are insignificant at
p=5% in three of the four models. Even if secondary earning lesbians do experience a marriage premium, this
is not dispositive of the specialization explanation because the scale of labor market work and housework do
not have to remain constant for specialization to take place. Among lesbian couples, the wages of a married
primary earner are between 7.6% and 8.9% more than their unmarried counterpart while the estimates for
married lesbian women place the earnings premium between 7.8% and 9.3% higher than unmarried primary
earning lesbian women. Unlike the results for gay men, children do not have any disparate e↵ect on primary
and secondary earners in lesbian couples. I also provide evidence that married lesbian women specialize
more than unmarried lesbian women.
In most instances, the marriage premium that I estimate is smaller than the premiums for straight men.
Korenman and Neumark (1991) reports that estimates of the marriage premium for straight men range
from 10% to 40%. Though my estimates are nearing the bottom end of that scale, they are still relatively
small. Because the re-organization of a household does not happen immediately, it may be the case that gay
and lesbian couples will gradually increase the degree of their specialization until their marriages and the
marriage premium more closely resemble straight couples. It is also possible that gay and lesbian couples
are and will continue to be more egalitarian than their same-sex counterparts, meaning that the gay and
lesbian marriage premium will continue to be lower than the straight marriage premium.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Same-sex marriage was able to become an objective of the gay and lesbian rights movements because of
several changes to the institution of marriage that allowed same-sex couples to envision themselves in a
marriage, but marriage equality became a primary objective of some portions of the movement only after
the AIDS epidemic and the lesbian baby boom highlighted the rights and benefits that gay and lesbian
couples could not access because they were legally prohibited from marrying their partner (Chauncey, 2005).
Indeed, one of the major changes to the institution of marriage over the course of the 20th century was
that it became the nexus by which rights and benefits were allocated (Chauncey, 2005, 71). The General
Accounting O ce of the United States found that there are “a total of 1,138 federal statutory provisions
classified in the United States Code in which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving benefits,
rights, and privileges,” but even this does not capture the full gamut of benefits of marriage that have been
codified into local laws and corporate bylaws (Badgett, 2009b). Badgett (2009b) highlights a number of
direct benefits that provided by marriage that can be accessed by the utterance of the words “I do”, like
access to health insurance and joint tax filing. However, there are a number of economic benefits that accrue
to straight men not simply because they are married, but because they behave di↵erently in marriage or are
selected into marriage because of certain traits. The “marriage premium” falls into this category.
In this senior project, I provide strong evidence that there is a sizable and robust marriage premium for
gay and lesbian couples and that the premium is driven by household specialization among married couples.
Just as household specialization does not a↵ect the wages of heterosexual partners in the same way, I find that
primary earning gay and lesbian people make significantly more when they are married, but there is no e↵ect
of marriage among gay secondary earners and only some evidence of a much smaller e↵ect among lesbian
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women. Though the magnitude of the premia only reach the low end estimate of the wage gap between
gay men and their same-sex counterparts, marriage has a positive e↵ect on the the wages and earnings of
the primary earner in gay and lesbian couples and does not show a negative e↵ect for the secondary earner.
This suggests, though inconclusively, that marriage may decrease the economic vulnerability of some gay
and lesbian people. However, this is not without a cost. There was a fervent debate among members of the
gay and lesbian movements over whether access to marriage was a right worth fighting for. Many dissenters
feared that marriage would undermine the new and innovative forms of intimacy that had developed in
gay and lesbian communities while others dismissed marriage as “imitating meaningless, bad habits of our
oppressors” (Chauncey, 2005, 93, 120). These fears seem to be born out in my empirical results, which
suggest that marriage makes gay and lesbian couples more like heterosexual couples with regards to their
household organization. It is also possible that, with time, gay and lesbian couples will look more like
di↵erent-sex couples with regard to specialization and the inter-household division of labor. This suggests
that marriage may increase the secondary earner’s dependence on the primary earner and decrease their
relative bargaining power within the relationship.
The unavailability of rich data sources that include gay and lesbian people imposes a number of limitations
on this study. First, the data limits my analysis to the wage e↵ects of marriage relative to cohabiting
couples. I am unable to analyze the labor market outcomes of gay and lesbian people relative to their
single counterparts. Second, my analysis lacks a concrete connection to household specialization because the
data does not exist. Though I do find that same-sex married couples have a larger gap in their wages and
hours worked than their unmarried counterparts, household specialization is more than the number of hours
worked, but the data does not contain any other measures of time use outside the labor market. Moreover,
using the crude measures of specialization that I have, I do not conclusively connect the marriage premium
for primary earners to the increased specialization. That is, I am able to say that married primary earners
make more than unmarried primary earners and that there is more specialization among married couples,
but I do not test the causal link between the two.
The limitations of my work raise questions for further research as data on gay and lesbian people becomes
more available. Namely, does specialization cause the marriage premium? I am also interested to observe
whether the e↵ects of marriage change as gay and lesbian couples have time to institutionalize the division
of duties in marriage. That is, will the degree of specialization in gay and lesbian couples increase as time
passes. Specifically, future research should focus on why the wages of the secondary earner remain positive
and whether this trend changes as the wage structure has time to adjust. Additionally, with nationwide
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marriage equality, it is now possible to test the e↵ects of marriage on the gap between homosexual and
heterosexual workers.
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Table 1: OLS Regression Results - Gay Men Living in States with Legalized Same-Sex Marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0479⇤⇤⇤ 0.0420⇤⇤⇤ 0.0527⇤⇤⇤ 0.0459⇤⇤⇤
(0.0112) (0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0109)
Age 0.0804⇤⇤⇤ 0.0706⇤⇤⇤ 0.0836⇤⇤⇤ 0.0725⇤⇤⇤
(0.00453) (0.00431) (0.00462) (0.00436)
Number of own children in the household 0.0342⇤⇤⇤ 0.0410⇤⇤⇤ 0.0371⇤⇤⇤ 0.0439⇤⇤⇤
(0.00868) (0.00830) (0.00897) (0.00850)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.109 -0.0860 -0.0631 -0.0320
(0.113) (0.0953) (0.129) (0.108)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0114 -0.0149 -0.00853 -0.0122
(0.0167) (0.0158) (0.0172) (0.0162)
Black=1 -0.208⇤⇤⇤ -0.151⇤⇤⇤ -0.233⇤⇤⇤ -0.175⇤⇤⇤
(0.0257) (0.0241) (0.0258) (0.0242)
Asian=1 -0.0432 -0.0499⇤ -0.0667⇤⇤ -0.0677⇤⇤
(0.0245) (0.0231) (0.0253) (0.0239)
American Indian=1 -0.229⇤ -0.218⇤ -0.226⇤ -0.213⇤
(0.101) (0.101) (0.0976) (0.0975)
Other race=1 -0.0771⇤⇤⇤ -0.0508⇤ -0.0811⇤⇤⇤ -0.0526⇤
(0.0226) (0.0214) (0.0230) (0.0216)
Hispanic=1 -0.164⇤⇤⇤ -0.113⇤⇤⇤ -0.188⇤⇤⇤ -0.133⇤⇤⇤
(0.0172) (0.0163) (0.0178) (0.0167)
Observations 15700 15700 15700 15700
Adjusted R2 0.252 0.333 0.263 0.350
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 2: OLS Regression Results - Gay Men Ages 18 to 64
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0447⇤⇤⇤ 0.0398⇤⇤⇤ 0.0500⇤⇤⇤ 0.0442⇤⇤⇤
(0.00950) (0.00899) (0.00975) (0.00918)
Age 0.0824⇤⇤⇤ 0.0713⇤⇤⇤ 0.0882⇤⇤⇤ 0.0756⇤⇤⇤
(0.00303) (0.00292) (0.00309) (0.00296)
Number of own children in the household 0.0248⇤⇤⇤ 0.0320⇤⇤⇤ 0.0264⇤⇤⇤ 0.0339⇤⇤⇤
(0.00687) (0.00648) (0.00705) (0.00661)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.0980 -0.0715 -0.112 -0.0805
(0.0882) (0.0787) (0.0915) (0.0821)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.00604 -0.00789 -0.00465 -0.00683
(0.0150) (0.0142) (0.0155) (0.0145)
Black=1 -0.210⇤⇤⇤ -0.149⇤⇤⇤ -0.236⇤⇤⇤ -0.172⇤⇤⇤
(0.0195) (0.0184) (0.0197) (0.0185)
Asian=1 -0.0401 -0.0501⇤ -0.0619⇤⇤ -0.0664⇤⇤
(0.0212) (0.0197) (0.0217) (0.0203)
American Indian=1 -0.253⇤⇤⇤ -0.224⇤⇤ -0.243⇤⇤⇤ -0.207⇤⇤
(0.0742) (0.0748) (0.0710) (0.0714)
Other race=1 -0.0899⇤⇤⇤ -0.0662⇤⇤⇤ -0.0943⇤⇤⇤ -0.0684⇤⇤⇤
(0.0183) (0.0174) (0.0186) (0.0176)
Hispanic=1 -0.158⇤⇤⇤ -0.106⇤⇤⇤ -0.180⇤⇤⇤ -0.124⇤⇤⇤
(0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0135) (0.0128)
Observations 25179 25179 25179 25179
Adjusted R2 0.271 0.350 0.282 0.367
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
77
Table 3: OLS Regression Results - Gay Men Ages 25 to 54
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0350⇤⇤⇤ 0.0326⇤⇤ 0.0411⇤⇤⇤ 0.0381⇤⇤⇤
(0.0105) (0.00991) (0.0108) (0.0101)
Age 0.0862⇤⇤⇤ 0.0752⇤⇤⇤ 0.0930⇤⇤⇤ 0.0801⇤⇤⇤
(0.00566) (0.00533) (0.00578) (0.00544)
Number of own children in the household 0.0275⇤⇤⇤ 0.0338⇤⇤⇤ 0.0296⇤⇤⇤ 0.0363⇤⇤⇤
(0.00730) (0.00690) (0.00746) (0.00701)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.131 -0.116 -0.155 -0.135
(0.104) (0.0926) (0.107) (0.0955)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0206 -0.0213 -0.0196 -0.0207
(0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0171) (0.0160)
Black=1 -0.201⇤⇤⇤ -0.141⇤⇤⇤ -0.231⇤⇤⇤ -0.167⇤⇤⇤
(0.0216) (0.0205) (0.0218) (0.0207)
Asian=1 -0.0223 -0.0343 -0.0454 -0.0523⇤
(0.0225) (0.0208) (0.0232) (0.0215)
American Indian=1 -0.195⇤⇤ -0.179⇤⇤ -0.184⇤⇤ -0.163⇤
(0.0690) (0.0684) (0.0658) (0.0652)
Other race=1 -0.0848⇤⇤⇤ -0.0590⇤⇤ -0.0886⇤⇤⇤ -0.0609⇤⇤
(0.0198) (0.0188) (0.0200) (0.0189)
Hispanic=1 -0.162⇤⇤⇤ -0.109⇤⇤⇤ -0.184⇤⇤⇤ -0.127⇤⇤⇤
(0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0147) (0.0139)
Observations 19894 19894 19894 19894
Adjusted R2 0.261 0.343 0.271 0.358
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 4: OLS Regression Results - All Employed People, with Full-Time Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0340⇤⇤⇤ 0.0294⇤⇤ 0.0304⇤⇤ 0.0251⇤
(0.00942) (0.00898) (0.0102) (0.00977)
Age 0.0747⇤⇤⇤ 0.0658⇤⇤⇤ 0.0806⇤⇤⇤ 0.0705⇤⇤⇤
(0.00342) (0.00329) (0.00370) (0.00356)
Number of own children in the household 0.0243⇤⇤⇤ 0.0301⇤⇤⇤ 0.0252⇤⇤⇤ 0.0309⇤⇤⇤
(0.00686) (0.00661) (0.00721) (0.00694)
State has an ENDA=1 0.00768 0.0661 -0.0593 0.00526
(0.0936) (0.0850) (0.108) (0.101)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.00351 -0.00751 0.00761 0.00228
(0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0163) (0.0155)
Full-time worker=1 0.253⇤⇤⇤ 0.153⇤⇤⇤ 1.069⇤⇤⇤ 0.961⇤⇤⇤
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0168) (0.0166)
Black=1 -0.172⇤⇤⇤ -0.118⇤⇤⇤ -0.207⇤⇤⇤ -0.149⇤⇤⇤
(0.0200) (0.0189) (0.0213) (0.0203)
Asian=1 -0.0427⇤ -0.0502⇤⇤ -0.0732⇤⇤ -0.0771⇤⇤⇤
(0.0205) (0.0191) (0.0226) (0.0213)
American Indian=1 -0.208⇤⇤ -0.187⇤⇤ -0.171⇤ -0.146⇤
(0.0689) (0.0694) (0.0704) (0.0705)
Other race=1 -0.0654⇤⇤⇤ -0.0445⇤ -0.0758⇤⇤⇤ -0.0531⇤⇤
(0.0191) (0.0185) (0.0205) (0.0200)
Hispanic=1 -0.149⇤⇤⇤ -0.0990⇤⇤⇤ -0.171⇤⇤⇤ -0.119⇤⇤⇤
(0.0133) (0.0127) (0.0147) (0.0142)
Observations 29151 29151 29151 29151
Adjusted R2 0.238 0.310 0.367 0.427
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 5: OLS Regression Results - Gay Men, With Education and Marriage Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0569⇤⇤⇤ 0.0461⇤⇤ 0.0677⇤⇤⇤ 0.0558⇤⇤⇤
(0.0151) (0.0142) (0.0155) (0.0145)
Married * No high school diploma 0.0137 0.0606 0.00196 0.0548
(0.0520) (0.0492) (0.0552) (0.0517)
Married * High school diploma or GED -0.00452 0.00160 -0.0139 -0.00780
(0.0213) (0.0204) (0.0219) (0.0208)
Married * Associates degree -0.0545 -0.0561⇤ -0.0606⇤ -0.0628⇤
(0.0297) (0.0282) (0.0304) (0.0289)
Married * Masters Degree -0.0234 -0.0102 -0.0314 -0.0176
(0.0241) (0.0226) (0.0248) (0.0231)
Married * Doctorate -0.0681 -0.0575 -0.0823 -0.0712
(0.0458) (0.0428) (0.0463) (0.0433)
Age 0.0796⇤⇤⇤ 0.0690⇤⇤⇤ 0.0843⇤⇤⇤ 0.0721⇤⇤⇤
(0.00353) (0.00336) (0.00359) (0.00341)
Number of own children in the household 0.0249⇤⇤⇤ 0.0323⇤⇤⇤ 0.0266⇤⇤⇤ 0.0343⇤⇤⇤
(0.00690) (0.00651) (0.00709) (0.00664)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.0912 -0.0671 -0.0977 -0.0688
(0.0924) (0.0822) (0.0956) (0.0858)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.00941 -0.0116 -0.00760 -0.0103
(0.0153) (0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0148)
Black=1 -0.214⇤⇤⇤ -0.152⇤⇤⇤ -0.242⇤⇤⇤ -0.176⇤⇤⇤
(0.0203) (0.0191) (0.0205) (0.0193)
Asian=1 -0.0429⇤ -0.0525⇤⇤ -0.0658⇤⇤ -0.0701⇤⇤⇤
(0.0214) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0205)
American Indian=1 -0.253⇤⇤ -0.232⇤⇤ -0.242⇤⇤ -0.214⇤⇤
(0.0785) (0.0792) (0.0751) (0.0755)
Other race=1 -0.0904⇤⇤⇤ -0.0645⇤⇤⇤ -0.0939⇤⇤⇤ -0.0659⇤⇤⇤
(0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0180)
Hispanic=1 -0.161⇤⇤⇤ -0.107⇤⇤⇤ -0.184⇤⇤⇤ -0.127⇤⇤⇤
(0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0139) (0.0131)
Observations 24460 24460 24460 24460
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.332 0.259 0.348
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 6: OLS Regression Results - Full-Sample of Gay Men Without Number of Children Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0507⇤⇤⇤ 0.0387⇤⇤⇤ 0.0486⇤⇤⇤ 0.0430⇤⇤⇤
(0.00950) (0.00910) (0.00989) (0.00929)
Age 0.0810⇤⇤⇤ 0.0691⇤⇤⇤ 0.0845⇤⇤⇤ 0.0723⇤⇤⇤
(0.00352) (0.00336) (0.00359) (0.00341)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.0941 -0.0658 -0.0978 -0.0680
(0.0928) (0.0822) (0.0956) (0.0858)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.00932 -0.0113 -0.00720 -0.00996
(0.0153) (0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0148)
Black=1 -0.210⇤⇤⇤ -0.152⇤⇤⇤ -0.242⇤⇤⇤ -0.176⇤⇤⇤
(0.0202) (0.0191) (0.0205) (0.0193)
Asian=1 -0.0396 -0.0527⇤⇤ -0.0659⇤⇤ -0.0703⇤⇤⇤
(0.0214) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0205)
American Indian=1 -0.249⇤⇤ -0.231⇤⇤ -0.241⇤⇤ -0.213⇤⇤
(0.0787) (0.0793) (0.0752) (0.0756)
Other race=1 -0.0893⇤⇤⇤ -0.0642⇤⇤⇤ -0.0939⇤⇤⇤ -0.0657⇤⇤⇤
(0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0180)
Hispanic=1 -0.158⇤⇤⇤ -0.107⇤⇤⇤ -0.183⇤⇤⇤ -0.126⇤⇤⇤
(0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0139) (0.0131)
Observations 24460 24460 24460 24460
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.332 0.259 0.348
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 7: OLS Regression Results - Gay Men Without Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0423⇤⇤⇤ 0.0375⇤⇤⇤ 0.0473⇤⇤⇤ 0.0415⇤⇤⇤
(0.0102) (0.00969) (0.0105) (0.00990)
Age 0.0786⇤⇤⇤ 0.0688⇤⇤⇤ 0.0830⇤⇤⇤ 0.0716⇤⇤⇤
(0.00370) (0.00353) (0.00377) (0.00358)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.0807 -0.0696 -0.0849 -0.0727
(0.101) (0.0909) (0.104) (0.0940)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0105 -0.0123 -0.00605 -0.00839
(0.0160) (0.0151) (0.0165) (0.0155)
Black=1 -0.214⇤⇤⇤ -0.158⇤⇤⇤ -0.240⇤⇤⇤ -0.181⇤⇤⇤
(0.0221) (0.0206) (0.0223) (0.0208)
Asian=1 -0.0290 -0.0425 -0.0467⇤ -0.0555⇤
(0.0231) (0.0217) (0.0236) (0.0223)
American Indian=1 -0.293⇤⇤ -0.279⇤⇤ -0.276⇤⇤ -0.255⇤⇤
(0.0933) (0.0938) (0.0895) (0.0899)
Other race=1 -0.0932⇤⇤⇤ -0.0631⇤⇤ -0.0917⇤⇤⇤ -0.0599⇤⇤
(0.0206) (0.0197) (0.0209) (0.0198)
Hispanic=1 -0.148⇤⇤⇤ -0.0986⇤⇤⇤ -0.172⇤⇤⇤ -0.120⇤⇤⇤
(0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0148) (0.0140)
Observations 21583 21583 21583 21583
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.326 0.254 0.342
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 8: OLS Regression Results - Gay Men With Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0633⇤ 0.0624⇤ 0.0717⇤ 0.0722⇤
(0.0299) (0.0285) (0.0307) (0.0289)
Age 0.0808⇤⇤⇤ 0.0624⇤⇤⇤ 0.0889⇤⇤⇤ 0.0688⇤⇤⇤
(0.0119) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0114)
Number of own children in the household 0.0153 0.0225 0.0189 0.0265⇤
(0.0129) (0.0122) (0.0133) (0.0125)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.0500 0.0530 -0.0742 0.0509
(0.203) (0.164) (0.213) (0.184)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 0.0123 0.00515 -0.00436 -0.0135
(0.0498) (0.0475) (0.0514) (0.0485)
Black=1 -0.202⇤⇤⇤ -0.105⇤ -0.237⇤⇤⇤ -0.130⇤
(0.0512) (0.0511) (0.0523) (0.0516)
Asian=1 -0.112⇤ -0.0880 -0.158⇤⇤ -0.125⇤
(0.0568) (0.0515) (0.0588) (0.0530)
American Indian=1 -0.190 -0.102 -0.218 -0.115
(0.119) (0.133) (0.111) (0.125)
Other race=1 -0.0814 -0.0652 -0.112⇤ -0.0902⇤
(0.0461) (0.0434) (0.0462) (0.0433)
Hispanic=1 -0.209⇤⇤⇤ -0.135⇤⇤⇤ -0.228⇤⇤⇤ -0.147⇤⇤⇤
(0.0393) (0.0383) (0.0413) (0.0397)
Observations 2877 2877 2877 2877
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.369 0.294 0.387
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 9: OLS Regression Results - Full-Sample of Gay Men with Time Trend Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0435⇤⇤⇤ 0.0387⇤⇤⇤ 0.0486⇤⇤⇤ 0.0430⇤⇤⇤
(0.00962) (0.00910) (0.00989) (0.00929)
Age 0.0798⇤⇤⇤ 0.0691⇤⇤⇤ 0.0845⇤⇤⇤ 0.0723⇤⇤⇤
(0.00353) (0.00336) (0.00359) (0.00341)
Number of own children in the household 0.0251⇤⇤⇤ 0.0325⇤⇤⇤ 0.0267⇤⇤⇤ 0.0345⇤⇤⇤
(0.00690) (0.00651) (0.00709) (0.00664)
State has an ENDA=1 -0.0906 -0.0658 -0.0978 -0.0680
(0.0924) (0.0822) (0.0956) (0.0858)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.00904 -0.0113 -0.00720 -0.00996
(0.0153) (0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0148)
Time Trend, 2012=1 0.0272 0.0201 0.0246 0.0154
(0.0216) (0.0204) (0.0221) (0.0208)
Time Trend Squared, 2012=1 -0.00293 -0.00183 -0.00254 -0.00113
(0.00316) (0.00298) (0.00325) (0.00305)
Black=1 -0.214⇤⇤⇤ -0.152⇤⇤⇤ -0.242⇤⇤⇤ -0.176⇤⇤⇤
(0.0203) (0.0191) (0.0205) (0.0193)
Asian=1 -0.0431⇤ -0.0527⇤⇤ -0.0659⇤⇤ -0.0703⇤⇤⇤
(0.0214) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0205)
American Indian=1 -0.253⇤⇤ -0.231⇤⇤ -0.241⇤⇤ -0.213⇤⇤
(0.0786) (0.0793) (0.0752) (0.0756)
Other race=1 -0.0903⇤⇤⇤ -0.0642⇤⇤⇤ -0.0939⇤⇤⇤ -0.0657⇤⇤⇤
(0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0180)
Hispanic=1 -0.160⇤⇤⇤ -0.107⇤⇤⇤ -0.183⇤⇤⇤ -0.126⇤⇤⇤
(0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0139) (0.0131)
Observations 24460 24460 24460 24460
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.332 0.259 0.348
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 10: OLS Regression Results - Full-Sample of Gay Men without ENDA Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0435⇤⇤⇤ 0.0387⇤⇤⇤ 0.0487⇤⇤⇤ 0.0431⇤⇤⇤
(0.00962) (0.00910) (0.00988) (0.00929)
Age 0.0797⇤⇤⇤ 0.0691⇤⇤⇤ 0.0845⇤⇤⇤ 0.0723⇤⇤⇤
(0.00353) (0.00336) (0.00359) (0.00341)
Number of own children in the household 0.0251⇤⇤⇤ 0.0325⇤⇤⇤ 0.0268⇤⇤⇤ 0.0345⇤⇤⇤
(0.00691) (0.00651) (0.00709) (0.00664)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.00969 -0.0117 -0.00790 -0.0105
(0.0152) (0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0147)
Black=1 -0.214⇤⇤⇤ -0.152⇤⇤⇤ -0.242⇤⇤⇤ -0.176⇤⇤⇤
(0.0203) (0.0191) (0.0205) (0.0193)
Asian=1 -0.0431⇤ -0.0527⇤⇤ -0.0659⇤⇤ -0.0703⇤⇤⇤
(0.0214) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0205)
American Indian=1 -0.254⇤⇤ -0.231⇤⇤ -0.243⇤⇤ -0.214⇤⇤
(0.0787) (0.0794) (0.0753) (0.0757)
Other race=1 -0.0902⇤⇤⇤ -0.0642⇤⇤⇤ -0.0939⇤⇤⇤ -0.0657⇤⇤⇤
(0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0180)
Hispanic=1 -0.160⇤⇤⇤ -0.107⇤⇤⇤ -0.183⇤⇤⇤ -0.127⇤⇤⇤
(0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0139) (0.0131)
Observations 24460 24460 24460 24460
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.332 0.259 0.348
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 11: OLS Regression Results - Lesbian Women Living in States with Legalized Same-Sex Marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0805⇤⇤⇤ 0.0707⇤⇤⇤ 0.0775⇤⇤⇤ 0.0673⇤⇤⇤
(0.00985) (0.00930) (0.0101) (0.00949)
Age 0.0783⇤⇤⇤ 0.0702⇤⇤⇤ 0.0831⇤⇤⇤ 0.0740⇤⇤⇤
(0.00391) (0.00374) (0.00397) (0.00377)
Number of own children in the household 0.0124⇤ 0.0135⇤ 0.00960 0.0106⇤
(0.00549) (0.00523) (0.00570) (0.00539)
State has an ENDA=1 0.241 0.196 0.185 0.139
(0.146) (0.143) (0.150) (0.144)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0183 -0.0122 -0.0202 -0.0146
(0.0146) (0.0138) (0.0150) (0.0141)
Black=1 -0.205⇤⇤⇤ -0.152⇤⇤⇤ -0.214⇤⇤⇤ -0.156⇤⇤⇤
(0.0199) (0.0190) (0.0199) (0.0190)
Asian=1 0.0176 0.000388 0.0186 0.00654
(0.0292) (0.0272) (0.0293) (0.0272)
American Indian=1 -0.0508 -0.0236 -0.0374 -0.0120
(0.0618) (0.0562) (0.0636) (0.0579)
Other race=1 -0.0199 -0.0134 -0.0158 -0.00789
(0.0215) (0.0202) (0.0222) (0.0209)
Hispanic=1 -0.108⇤⇤⇤ -0.0822⇤⇤⇤ -0.118⇤⇤⇤ -0.0904⇤⇤⇤
(0.0162) (0.0154) (0.0166) (0.0157)
Observations 15157 15157 15157 15157
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.364 0.293 0.379
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 12: OLS Regression Results - Lesbian Women Ages 18 to 64
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0657⇤⇤⇤ 0.0554⇤⇤⇤ 0.0674⇤⇤⇤ 0.0560⇤⇤⇤
(0.00811) (0.00767) (0.00830) (0.00782)
Age 0.0810⇤⇤⇤ 0.0706⇤⇤⇤ 0.0873⇤⇤⇤ 0.0761⇤⇤⇤
(0.00254) (0.00244) (0.00259) (0.00247)
Number of own children in the household 0.0100⇤ 0.0131⇤⇤⇤ 0.00709 0.0101⇤
(0.00421) (0.00399) (0.00437) (0.00411)
State has an ENDA=1 0.149 0.136 0.129 0.120
(0.0922) (0.0915) (0.0946) (0.0931)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0238 -0.0191 -0.0267⇤ -0.0222
(0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0135) (0.0126)
Black=1 -0.169⇤⇤⇤ -0.124⇤⇤⇤ -0.183⇤⇤⇤ -0.134⇤⇤⇤
(0.0147) (0.0139) (0.0148) (0.0140)
Asian=1 0.0163 -0.000137 0.0160 0.00527
(0.0247) (0.0228) (0.0247) (0.0229)
American Indian=1 -0.0583 -0.0223 -0.0451 -0.00923
(0.0445) (0.0413) (0.0461) (0.0430)
Other race=1 -0.0114 -0.0120 -0.00837 -0.00727
(0.0166) (0.0156) (0.0172) (0.0160)
Hispanic=1 -0.104⇤⇤⇤ -0.0827⇤⇤⇤ -0.113⇤⇤⇤ -0.0905⇤⇤⇤
(0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.0120)
Observations 24910 24910 24910 24910
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.399 0.336 0.416
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 13: OLS Regression Results - Lesbian Women Ages 25 to 54
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0700⇤⇤⇤ 0.0582⇤⇤⇤ 0.0737⇤⇤⇤ 0.0609⇤⇤⇤
(0.00912) (0.00861) (0.00932) (0.00878)
Age 0.0800⇤⇤⇤ 0.0726⇤⇤⇤ 0.0850⇤⇤⇤ 0.0766⇤⇤⇤
(0.00493) (0.00468) (0.00504) (0.00476)
Number of own children in the household 0.0118⇤⇤ 0.0147⇤⇤⇤ 0.00860 0.0113⇤⇤
(0.00447) (0.00424) (0.00464) (0.00436)
State has an ENDA=1 0.172 0.162 0.137 0.128
(0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0278 -0.0211 -0.0324⇤ -0.0251
(0.0148) (0.0139) (0.0152) (0.0142)
Black=1 -0.178⇤⇤⇤ -0.131⇤⇤⇤ -0.191⇤⇤⇤ -0.140⇤⇤⇤
(0.0163) (0.0155) (0.0164) (0.0156)
Asian=1 0.0338 0.0106 0.0349 0.0169
(0.0267) (0.0248) (0.0266) (0.0248)
American Indian=1 -0.0736 -0.0371 -0.0480 -0.0116
(0.0523) (0.0481) (0.0545) (0.0505)
Other race=1 -0.0197 -0.0165 -0.0157 -0.0106
(0.0184) (0.0173) (0.0190) (0.0177)
Hispanic=1 -0.0958⇤⇤⇤ -0.0783⇤⇤⇤ -0.105⇤⇤⇤ -0.0858⇤⇤⇤
(0.0139) (0.0132) (0.0142) (0.0134)
Observations 19356 19356 19356 19356
Adjusted R2 0.289 0.370 0.302 0.387
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 14: OLS Regression Results - Lesbian Women, All Employed People, with Full-Time Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0674⇤⇤⇤ 0.0559⇤⇤⇤ 0.0537⇤⇤⇤ 0.0418⇤⇤⇤
(0.00814) (0.00776) (0.00922) (0.00884)
Age 0.0713⇤⇤⇤ 0.0641⇤⇤⇤ 0.0817⇤⇤⇤ 0.0735⇤⇤⇤
(0.00295) (0.00283) (0.00338) (0.00328)
Number of own children in the household 0.00790 0.00931⇤ -0.000986 -0.000291
(0.00409) (0.00391) (0.00473) (0.00455)
State has an ENDA=1 0.163 0.162 0.166 0.172
(0.0963) (0.0954) (0.101) (0.0997)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0172 -0.0136 -0.0202 -0.0164
(0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0148) (0.0141)
Full-time worker=1 0.245⇤⇤⇤ 0.160⇤⇤⇤ 1.027⇤⇤⇤ 0.937⇤⇤⇤
(0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0145) (0.0144)
Black=1 -0.161⇤⇤⇤ -0.118⇤⇤⇤ -0.197⇤⇤⇤ -0.149⇤⇤⇤
(0.0154) (0.0147) (0.0172) (0.0166)
Asian=1 -0.0114 -0.0238 -0.0182 -0.0244
(0.0242) (0.0228) (0.0266) (0.0255)
American Indian=1 -0.0575 -0.0168 -0.0619 -0.0184
(0.0413) (0.0388) (0.0450) (0.0419)
Other race=1 -0.0310 -0.0218 -0.0565⇤⇤ -0.0448⇤
(0.0172) (0.0163) (0.0206) (0.0197)
Hispanic=1 -0.102⇤⇤⇤ -0.0830⇤⇤⇤ -0.107⇤⇤⇤ -0.0863⇤⇤⇤
(0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0144) (0.0139)
Observations 29458 29458 29458 29458
Adjusted R2 0.272 0.344 0.404 0.455
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 15: OLS Regression Results - Lesbian Women, Education and Marriage Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0643⇤⇤⇤ 0.0473⇤⇤⇤ 0.0659⇤⇤⇤ 0.0484⇤⇤⇤
(0.0140) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0134)
Married * No high school diploma -0.0618 -0.0324 -0.0303 -0.00249
(0.0510) (0.0479) (0.0514) (0.0481)
Married * High school diploma or GED 0.00428 0.0124 0.00419 0.0126
(0.0194) (0.0183) (0.0199) (0.0186)
Married * Associates degree -0.0139 0.00879 -0.0125 0.0118
(0.0253) (0.0236) (0.0255) (0.0238)
Married * Masters Degree 0.0248 0.0307 0.0223 0.0267
(0.0208) (0.0196) (0.0215) (0.0201)
Married * Doctorate -0.0159 -0.00490 -0.0464 -0.0372
(0.0397) (0.0379) (0.0402) (0.0386)
Age 0.0755⇤⇤⇤ 0.0674⇤⇤⇤ 0.0817⇤⇤⇤ 0.0724⇤⇤⇤
(0.00307) (0.00293) (0.00313) (0.00297)
Number of own children in the household 0.0109⇤ 0.0135⇤⇤⇤ 0.00800 0.0105⇤
(0.00426) (0.00403) (0.00442) (0.00415)
State has an ENDA=1 0.122 0.125 0.103 0.112
(0.0969) (0.0965) (0.0991) (0.0980)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0231 -0.0193 -0.0274⇤ -0.0238
(0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0138) (0.0130)
Black=1 -0.179⇤⇤⇤ -0.129⇤⇤⇤ -0.193⇤⇤⇤ -0.138⇤⇤⇤
(0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0146)
Asian=1 0.0152 -0.00164 0.0153 0.00410
(0.0251) (0.0233) (0.0251) (0.0233)
American Indian=1 -0.0478 -0.0130 -0.0304 0.00419
(0.0463) (0.0427) (0.0478) (0.0442)
Other race=1 -0.0145 -0.0127 -0.0109 -0.00733
(0.0177) (0.0165) (0.0182) (0.0170)
Hispanic=1 -0.106⇤⇤⇤ -0.0828⇤⇤⇤ -0.116⇤⇤⇤ -0.0921⇤⇤⇤
(0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0126)
Observations 23794 23794 23794 23794
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.365 0.295 0.382
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 16: OLS Regression Results - Full-Sample of Lesbian Women Without Number of Children Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0700⇤⇤⇤ 0.0577⇤⇤⇤ 0.0684⇤⇤⇤ 0.0577⇤⇤⇤
(0.00827) (0.00785) (0.00850) (0.00800)
Age 0.0769⇤⇤⇤ 0.0674⇤⇤⇤ 0.0818⇤⇤⇤ 0.0724⇤⇤⇤
(0.00302) (0.00293) (0.00312) (0.00297)
State has an ENDA=1 0.120 0.125 0.101 0.111
(0.0969) (0.0966) (0.0991) (0.0981)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0232 -0.0195 -0.0274⇤ -0.0240
(0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0138) (0.0130)
Black=1 -0.176⇤⇤⇤ -0.129⇤⇤⇤ -0.194⇤⇤⇤ -0.139⇤⇤⇤
(0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0146)
Asian=1 0.0147 -0.00230 0.0147 0.00361
(0.0252) (0.0233) (0.0252) (0.0233)
American Indian=1 -0.0455 -0.0124 -0.0301 0.00405
(0.0464) (0.0428) (0.0479) (0.0443)
Other race=1 -0.0143 -0.0127 -0.0110 -0.00734
(0.0177) (0.0165) (0.0182) (0.0170)
Hispanic=1 -0.105⇤⇤⇤ -0.0830⇤⇤⇤ -0.117⇤⇤⇤ -0.0922⇤⇤⇤
(0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0126)
Observations 23794 23794 23794 23794
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.365 0.295 0.382
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 17: OLS Regression Results - Lesbian Women Without Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0497⇤⇤⇤ 0.0457⇤⇤⇤ 0.0460⇤⇤⇤ 0.0419⇤⇤⇤
(0.00994) (0.00937) (0.0102) (0.00955)
Age 0.0752⇤⇤⇤ 0.0675⇤⇤⇤ 0.0813⇤⇤⇤ 0.0726⇤⇤⇤
(0.00347) (0.00330) (0.00353) (0.00335)
State has an ENDA=1 0.101 0.102 0.107 0.119
(0.137) (0.136) (0.142) (0.140)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.00187 -0.00645 -0.00657 -0.0120
(0.0159) (0.0149) (0.0163) (0.0152)
Black=1 -0.163⇤⇤⇤ -0.111⇤⇤⇤ -0.173⇤⇤⇤ -0.116⇤⇤⇤
(0.0195) (0.0183) (0.0194) (0.0183)
Asian=1 0.0533 0.0315 0.0564⇤ 0.0416
(0.0290) (0.0267) (0.0285) (0.0262)
American Indian=1 -0.0754 -0.0633 -0.0518 -0.0419
(0.0590) (0.0536) (0.0614) (0.0560)
Other race=1 -0.0216 -0.0232 -0.0189 -0.0180
(0.0215) (0.0204) (0.0222) (0.0209)
Hispanic=1 -0.0929⇤⇤⇤ -0.0731⇤⇤⇤ -0.107⇤⇤⇤ -0.0857⇤⇤⇤
(0.0159) (0.0151) (0.0162) (0.0154)
Married=1 0.0497⇤⇤⇤ 0.0457⇤⇤⇤ 0.0460⇤⇤⇤ 0.0419⇤⇤⇤
(0.00994) (0.00937) (0.0102) (0.00955)
Observations 16541 16541 16541 16541
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.347 0.277 0.365
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 18: OLS Regression Results - Lesbian Women With Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.106⇤⇤⇤ 0.0842⇤⇤⇤ 0.117⇤⇤⇤ 0.0929⇤⇤⇤
(0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0157) (0.0148)
Age 0.0747⇤⇤⇤ 0.0640⇤⇤⇤ 0.0808⇤⇤⇤ 0.0689⇤⇤⇤
(0.00669) (0.00648) (0.00682) (0.00658)
Number of own children in the household 0.00709 0.0131 0.00360 0.00967
(0.00783) (0.00747) (0.00816) (0.00768)
State has an ENDA=1 0.175 0.184 0.110 0.117
(0.120) (0.124) (0.118) (0.120)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0678⇤⇤ -0.0432 -0.0706⇤⇤ -0.0442
(0.0253) (0.0239) (0.0263) (0.0246)
Black=1 -0.203⇤⇤⇤ -0.153⇤⇤⇤ -0.223⇤⇤⇤ -0.168⇤⇤⇤
(0.0247) (0.0237) (0.0252) (0.0239)
Asian=1 -0.0687 -0.0705 -0.0754 -0.0741
(0.0484) (0.0454) (0.0497) (0.0468)
American Indian=1 -0.00532 0.0644 0.0000260 0.0742
(0.0749) (0.0699) (0.0762) (0.0716)
Other race=1 -0.00357 0.00625 0.00160 0.0119
(0.0311) (0.0287) (0.0320) (0.0294)
Hispanic=1 -0.127⇤⇤⇤ -0.0956⇤⇤⇤ -0.132⇤⇤⇤ -0.0991⇤⇤⇤
(0.0235) (0.0224) (0.0237) (0.0225)
Observations 7253 7253 7253 7253
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.402 0.332 0.417
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 19: OLS Regression Results - Full-Sample of Lesbian Women with Time Trend Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0677⇤⇤⇤ 0.0577⇤⇤⇤ 0.0684⇤⇤⇤ 0.0577⇤⇤⇤
(0.00831) (0.00785) (0.00850) (0.00800)
Age 0.0756⇤⇤⇤ 0.0674⇤⇤⇤ 0.0818⇤⇤⇤ 0.0724⇤⇤⇤
(0.00307) (0.00293) (0.00312) (0.00297)
Number of own children in the household 0.0107⇤ 0.0134⇤⇤⇤ 0.00783 0.0104⇤
(0.00426) (0.00403) (0.00442) (0.00415)
State has an ENDA=1 0.121 0.125 0.101 0.111
(0.0969) (0.0966) (0.0991) (0.0981)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0231 -0.0195 -0.0274⇤ -0.0240
(0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0138) (0.0130)
Time Trend, 2012=1 -0.00290 -0.00242 0.0125 0.0118
(0.0190) (0.0179) (0.0194) (0.0182)
Time Trend Squared, 2012=1 0.000855 0.000795 -0.00114 -0.00102
(0.00279) (0.00263) (0.00286) (0.00268)
Black=1 -0.179⇤⇤⇤ -0.129⇤⇤⇤ -0.194⇤⇤⇤ -0.139⇤⇤⇤
(0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0146)
Asian=1 0.0145 -0.00230 0.0147 0.00361
(0.0252) (0.0233) (0.0252) (0.0233)
American Indian=1 -0.0466 -0.0124 -0.0301 0.00405
(0.0465) (0.0428) (0.0479) (0.0443)
Other race=1 -0.0147 -0.0127 -0.0110 -0.00734
(0.0177) (0.0165) (0.0182) (0.0170)
Hispanic=1 -0.106⇤⇤⇤ -0.0830⇤⇤⇤ -0.117⇤⇤⇤ -0.0922⇤⇤⇤
(0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0126)
Observations 23794 23794 23794 23794
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.365 0.295 0.382
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 20: OLS Regression Results - Full-Sample of Lesbian Women without ENDA Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Earnings) ln(Earnings)
Married=1 0.0675⇤⇤⇤ 0.0576⇤⇤⇤ 0.0683⇤⇤⇤ 0.0576⇤⇤⇤
(0.00831) (0.00785) (0.00850) (0.00800)
Age 0.0756⇤⇤⇤ 0.0675⇤⇤⇤ 0.0818⇤⇤⇤ 0.0725⇤⇤⇤
(0.00306) (0.00293) (0.00312) (0.00297)
Number of own children in the household 0.0106⇤ 0.0134⇤⇤⇤ 0.00781 0.0103⇤
(0.00426) (0.00403) (0.00442) (0.00415)
Same-sex marriage legal=1 -0.0221 -0.0185 -0.0266 -0.0231
(0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0138) (0.0130)
Black=1 -0.179⇤⇤⇤ -0.129⇤⇤⇤ -0.193⇤⇤⇤ -0.139⇤⇤⇤
(0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0146)
Asian=1 0.0144 -0.00233 0.0146 0.00358
(0.0252) (0.0233) (0.0252) (0.0233)
American Indian=1 -0.0466 -0.0123 -0.0300 0.00411
(0.0465) (0.0429) (0.0479) (0.0444)
Other race=1 -0.0149 -0.0130 -0.0112 -0.00756
(0.0177) (0.0165) (0.0182) (0.0170)
Hispanic=1 -0.106⇤⇤⇤ -0.0829⇤⇤⇤ -0.117⇤⇤⇤ -0.0921⇤⇤⇤
(0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0126)
Observations 23794 23794 23794 23794
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.365 0.295 0.382
Note: The regression also controls for state and year fixed e↵ects, educational attainment, metropolitan status
and age squared. Columns (2) and (4) include occupation indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations from 2012 through 2017 American Community Survey.
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
